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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 48 OCTOBER 1973 NUMBER 1
AFTER RELEASE - THE PAROLEE
IN SOCIETY
ROBERT E. WOLIN*
INTRODUCTION
In January and February of 1972 the New York State Special
Commission on Attica interviewed nearly 2,000 Attica inmates and of-
ficers in an attempt to understand the influences and events that led
to the bloodiest one-day confrontation between Americans in the twen-
tieth century. When the information culled from inmate interviews
was reviewed, it was apparent that the single overwhelming grievance
named by Attica inmates was the operation of the New York State
parole system.
Distrust and fear of the parole process in New York State was
often a key element in an inmate's outlook on his prison existence,
rehabilitative efforts and actual conduct while under community super-
vision. The lack of success of the parole system can in part be attrib-
uted to the manner in which parolees are supervised after their re-
lease from prison, and the conditions under which parole can be
revoked.
Parole,' an offender's conditional release from a correctional in-
stitution to the supervision of a parole officer for the unexpired part
of the original sentence, is the most common procedure by which
* B.A., Lafayette College, 1969; J.D., New York University, 1972.
I Parole is not the same as probation, although the two have similar purposes and
are often confused. Probation is a device used by the courts after the defendant has been
convicted or has pleaded guilty, and is then placed under the supervision of a probation
officer to remain in the community during the period of suspended sentence imposed by
the court. In New York, probation is administered by the courts on a local level while
parole is administered by the Department of Correctional Services on a state-wide basis.
While probation is a pre-institutional procedure, parole is part of the correctional process
invoked after the offender has served a portion of his sentence in a correctional institution.
Parole is also radically different from pardon. A pardon blots out the very existence
of guilt so that the person pardoned is thereafter considered as if he had never committed
the crime. Parole is "not an act of clemency, but a penological measure for the discipli-
nary treatment of prisoners.... Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28
A.2d 897 (1942); Gordon v. Gordon's Adm'r, 168 Ky. 409, 182 S.W. 220 (1916).
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inmates are released from state correctional facilities. In 1970 more
than 90 percent of all inmates released from prison in New York State
were released on parole;2 in that year 8,171 new inmates were released
to parole supervision in New York State, bringing the minimum num-
ber of men under active parole supervision during 1970 to 17,510.3
The modem methodology4 of parole in the United States had its
inception in the 19th century when the dominant penal philosophy
shifted from punishment to rehabilitation.5 The actual development
of a functioning parole system, however, was dependent upon three
elements: the implementation of the indeterminate sentence, voca-
2 In 1970, 8,171 inmates were released from state correctional facilities to parole in
New York. In the same year 598 inmates either died in prison, were released for medical
reasons, or because they had completed their maximum sentences. Thus, in 1970, 92%o of
all inmates leaving New York state correctional facilities were released on parole. The
figure of 92% marks an increase from the comparison year of 1964 when 86% of all prison
releases in New York State were on parole. This data was supplied to the New York State
Special Commission on Attica by Dr. John M. Stanton, Head of the Bureau of Statistics
of the Department of Correctional Services. The national figures for 1964, indicate that
New York State ranked 42nd out of 52 jurisdictions in percentage of prison releases on
parole. The states having the highest percentage of total releases on parole were Washing-
ton and New Hampshire where parole constituted 100% of all releases in 1964. The state
with the smallest percentage of inmates released on parole was South Carolina with 10%.
The average national figure for 1964 was 60%. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DES'T
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS
FoR ADULT FELONS 35 (1964).
3 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, FACTS AND FIGUtS FOR 1970 at 29 (1970).
[hereinafter cited as FACTS AND FIGURES 1970].
4 The historical roots of parole date to the system of deportation or transportation
developed by the English in the 17th century. The practice of deportation involved miti-
gation of a penal sentence and placement of a prisoner in a free community. One of the
first to realize the penological benefit of a program of transportation was Captain Alex-
ander Maconochie, often called the father of parole. It was his proposal that the duration
of a prisoner's sentence be determined by the industry and good character of the prisoner.
To implement his proposal, Maconochie developed a system of "marks" that could be used
in connection with deportation. Under this approach a prisoner passed from strict im-
prisonment to conditional release and then to final and complete liberty. Maconochie
believed that his system of gradual release was necessary because an inmate's sudden re-
lease from maximum custody directly into the community might produce a "violent re-
action" on the part of inmates believed anxious to satisfy repressed desires. C. NEWMAN,
SOURcEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS 9 (1958) [hereinafter cited as NEwMAN].
A contrary historical evaluation of Maconochie's prison reforms suggests that his system
of "marks" was defective in that some inmates were
better fitted, bodily and mentally, to earn more marks than others, while quite
a few of them might be fundamentally unfit to earn any marks at all.
G. PLAYFAiR, THE PUNrIVE OBSasSION 90 (1971).
5 The fundamental aim of penology remained the protection of society, but it was
now felt that the most economical way of protecting society was to restore the offender to
normal social functioning. See the 1876 Report of the New York Prison Association which
stressed in part:
Increase in the numerical force and depredations of habitual criminals may not
be prevented until the condition and management of convicts who are about to
be released ...and the discriminating concern for them as they go from the
prisons into a free life, shall have been placed on a sound footing.
I U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATr'Y GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 785-86 (1939).
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tional training for inmates, and the development of a method for
supervising inmates once released to the community.
The single most important step toward the growth of the modern
parole system was the implementation of the indeterminate sentence. 6
The indeterminate sentence was designed to allow the court to sen-
tence the offender to a minimum and maximum term of imprison-
ment rather than to a fixed or definite period of confinement. The
actual length of confinement was to be determined by the correctional
authorities within the limits established by the court. Prisoners would
be selectively released when they were thought to be prepared to re-
turn to society. The second element contributing to the development of
a parole system was the belief that prisoners should be educated and
trained in useful skills before they were released from prison. Voca-
tional training was to make an inmate a productive member of society
and contribute to his overall fitness for early release under an indeter-
minate sentencing scheme.7 The third and final element necessary for
a parole system was the development of a method for supervising in-
mates once they were released to the community." Early supervision
efforts amounted to little more than placement services. New York ap-
proached the present concept of parole supervision in 1877 with the
appointment of a state agent whose duty it would be to visit prisoners
prior to their release and confer with them about their post-prison
plans. The agent was to seek suitable employers and provide the in-
mates with necessary transportation, food, clothing, tools and advice
after their release.9
These separate reforms were integrated into the nation's first
6 The indeterminate sentence was first used in the United States in 1825 at New York's
House of Refuge for Juvenile Offenders. C. Gwuetiz, THE PAROLE PRoc.ss 10 (1959). It
was first applied to adult convicts by the State of Michigan in 1869. Id. at 11. New York
followed in 1877 with its first adult indeterminate sentence law which was applicable only
to males 16-80 years of age sentenced to the Elmira Reformatory. Lawi of April 24, 1877,
ch. 173, § 2, [1877] N.Y. Laws 186.
7 Law of April 27, 1870, ch. 427, § 9, [1870] N.Y. Laws 978. One of the earliest pro-
grams for vocational training was instituted by the New York Legislature in the 1870
legislation which established the Elmira Reformatory and provided that agricultural and
mechanical industry should be used to reform the prisoners sentenced to Elmira.
8 There were two possible early English models for community parole supervision. The
first model was the indenture system used by the English House of Refuge. Under the
indenture system the child-inmate was released to a master. The second model, the ticket-
to-leave, had the released prisoner report to the community police for supervision. Both
the indenture system and police supervision were felt to be unacceptable in the United
States. The parole concept that flourished in the United States was release to the super-
vision of a "next-friend." The "next-friend" was originally a private citizen but soon be-
came a state employee, the parole officer. See G=Dnxrm, supra note 6, at 10-11, and
NEwAMAN, supra note 4, at 19.
9 Law of June 6, 1877, ch. 424, §§ 1, 2, [1877] N.Y. Laws 481.
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parole system by Z. R. Brockway at Elmira Reformatory in 1877.
Adopting Brockway's system, the New York Legislature in 1877
instituted the indeterminate sentence and provided for selective re-
lease procedures and supervision of reformatory inmates released on
parole.10 Brockway's "'Elmira Plan" became the prototype for later
parole systems in New York and throughout the United States.
In 1901 New York's parole system began functioning on a regular
basis. In that year the indeterminate sentence law was restructured.
The option"1 of imposing an indeterminate sentence was no longer
available in every case; instead, it was mandatory if the defendant had
never before been convicted of a crime punishable in a state prison and
the maximum definite sentence which would have been imposed was
five years or less.' Provisions were also made for the appointment of
a parole officer at each prison, whose function it would be to aid pris-
oners in securing employment and to visit and supervise parolees.
This article will first follow the experience of parolees under com-
munity supervision, and attempt to determine whether New York
State has met the goal of using the period of community supervision
as one of rehabilitation and readjustment. It will then discuss parole
revocation and analyze whether revocation serves the purpose of re-
moving men from the community who cannot function peaceably
within society or whether it reinstitutionalizes those who cannot func-
tion under the rules of the Department of Correctional Services.
10 Law of April 24, 1877, ch. 173, §§ 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, [1877] N.Y. Laws 186-9. The 1877
legislation was the first time the word parole was used in a legislative enactment. Section
5 of the act provided that:
The said board of managers shall... establish rules and regulations under which
prisoners within the reformatory may be allowed to go upon parole outside of
the reformatory....
Section 10 added:
[S]aid managers may appoint suitable persons in any part of the state charged
with the duty of supervising prisoners who are released on parole....
11 In 1889, parole release procedures spread from the state reformatory to state prison
and the legislature enacted a law permitting the sentencing judge to impose an optional
indeterminate prison sentence in the case of any felony offender. Law of June 6, 1889, ch.
382, § 74, [1889] N.Y. Laws 522. Prisoners sentenced to an indeterminate sentence under
the option of 1889 were eligible to apply for parole and to appear before the prison's
Board of Commissioners of Paroled Prisoners at the completion of the minimum term of
their indeterminate sentence. It was the responsibility of the Board to determine if there
was a "reasonable probability" that the applicant would remain at liberty without violat-
ing the law and, if so, to parole the applicant under the conditions prescribed by the
Board. Law of June 6, 1889, ch. 382, § 78, [1889] N.Y. Laws 522-3. The judiciary was
initially hostile to the concept of indeterminate sentence and parole. From 1899 until the
law was amended in 1901, only 115 of the 13,000 plus prison sentences imposed in New
York were indeterminate sentences. See Lewis, New York State Board of Parole, 2 J. CrIM.
L.C. & P.S. 791, 794 (1912).
12 Law of April 18, 1901, ch. 425, § 1, [1901] N.Y. Laws 1115.
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PAROLE SUPERVISION
A parolee's1 3 readjustment to society14 after release is carefully
and closely regulated by parole authorities. Before release from the
correctional facility, the Institutional Parole Officer discusses the rules
and regulations of parole supervision with the prospective parolee to
ensure that he understands what is expected of him. As a prerequisite
for parole, each inmate promises to obey the conditions of his parole;
and a copy of these conditions is given to the parolee.15 When a
parolee is not notified of the conditions of his parole he is not liable
for a violation of those conditions.' 6
This section will analyze the supervision of parolees, both in the
crucial initial period after release and during the subsequent super-
vision in the community. An inmate's release on parole can be more
than merely an additional custodial stage, but rather should serve as
a positive period of rehabilitation. With this goal in mind, emphasis
will be placed first on an examination of the effectiveness and value
of the rules that regulate the daily life of a parolee. Second, both the
practical and theoretical ability of parole officers to function as effec-
tive catalysts in the rehabilitative process will be analyzed. The officer's
ability to function effectively in the rehabilitative process will be
examined by means of a comparison of the scope of his power to carry
out a search and seizure of his parolee and his capacity to alleviate his
parolee's job disability.
Conditions of Parole Supervision
As a first condition of parole, a parolee agrees to proceed, within
24 hours of release, to the area office of the Division of Parole to make
his arrival report and to be placed under supervision.'7 During either
the arrival report or the initial interview, 8 the parolee reviews and
18 The total number of parolees under Community supervision during all or part of
1970 was 14,637. FAcrs AND FIGUREs 1970 at 20.
14 While under parole supervision, a parolee remains in constructive legal custody,
subject at all times to the control of the Board of Parole. See People v. Santos, 31 App.
Div. 2d 508, 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (Ist Dep't), aifd, 25 N.Y.2d 976, 252 N.E.2d 781,
305 N.Y.S2d 865 (1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 969 (1970); People v. Adams, 63 Misc. 2d
52, 53, 810 N.Y.S2d 7, 11 (Schenectady County Ct. 1970).
'5 N.Y. Comno. LAW § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
16 See People ex rel. Marvin v. McDonnell, 280 App. Div. 367, 369, 113 N.Y.S.2d 585,
586 (1st Dep't 1952), which held that a parolee could not be imprisoned for failure to
make the necessary arrival report within twenty-four hours of his release when he had
not received notice of his obligation to report.
17 N.Y. STATE MANUAL FOR FIELD PAROLE OFFICERS § 201.0 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
FIELD PARoLE], provides for a waiver of making an arrival report within 24 hours where
making such a report would entail travelling great distances or other hardships.
18 The arrival report and initial interview are often combined into one session.
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discusses the rules and regulations of parole and what these rules and
regulations mean in his particular case.19
There are five types of rules that control the daily supervision of
a parolee. First are those rules derived from the initial classification
of an individual case as either "intensive" or "active." Second, regard-
less of the classification, all parolees are subject to the fifteen general
conditions established by the Board of Parole. Third, as the individual
case warrants, the Parole Board stipulates specific provisions to sup-
plement the general rules. Fourth, in his developing relationship with
his parole officer, the parolee may be subject to the application of a
full spectrum of additional rules imposed at the discretion of the
officer. Fifth, there are the unwritten rules of parole.
Classification of Cases. The degree of supervision exercised over
a parolee depends on which of three general classifications is assigned
to his case: intensive supervision, active supervision or reduced super-
vision.20
Following release from a correctional institution all parolees are
placed on intensive supervision for a minimum period of three
months. 21 Intensive supervision means that a parolee must report to
his officer on a weekly basis, a time-span which may be extended at the
discretion of his parole officer up to, but not including, a monthly
basis. Responsibilities for the parole officer include a minimum of one
employment check per month, a minimum of one positive employment
visit every three months and a minimum of one positive home visit
every three months.22 If the Parole Board has specifically labeled the
case as intensive, then it remains so until changed by the Board.23 For
19 In addition to the discussion of the rules of parole the initial interview has four
main objectives: (1) to establish a casework relationship; (2) to secure parolee's participa-
tion in an analysis of his problem; (3) to make constructive suggestions relating to parolee's
problem; and (4) to leave the parolee with positive assurances as to what he may expect.
Fbm. PAROL § 202.0.
20 Research into the files of 61 men revoked from parole and present at Attica during
the disturbances of September 9-13, 1971 indicate the pattern of supervision:
Types of Supervision
White Black Puerto Rican Indian Total
Active 83 18 8 2 56
Intensive 1 3 0 0 4
Reduced 0 0 0 0 0
Sensitive 1 0 0 0 1
61
21 FrELD PAto.E § 204.0.
22 Id. § 204.0(I)(A).
23 The Parole Board may choose not to make a final determination on the status of
a particular case and designate it as intensive at the discretion of the Area Director or
supervising parole officer. Id. § 204(11) (B).
[Vol. 48:1
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the great majority of parolees, after three months of intensive super-
vision, their status automatically changes to active supervision, char-
acterized by reduced reporting on the part of the parolee and reduced
visitation by the parole officer.24
Parolees are maintained under active supervision for a minimum
period of two years before being considered for placement under re-
duced supervision. On reduced supervision the parolee reports quar-
terly or less frequently. Home visits by the parole officer are made
with the same frequency that reports are required.25 Data indicates
that the use of a two-year base period for active supervision has value
because it is during the first and second years on parole that over 90
percent of all recidivism occurs.26 In light of the large and burdensome
caseload borne by parole officers, which often does not allow for pe-
riodic review, the change of status to reduced supervision should be
automatic unless the officer specifically states otherwise.
Area supervisors may, at their discretion, designate a case as sen-
sitive.27 The label sensitive is designed to indicate behavior which
might result in widespread danger to the community should the in-
dividual revert to criminal activity.28 Once placed in this category,
the parolee usually remains in it for the duration of his parole period.
The fact that a parolee is carried in the sensitive category will not
necessarily affect the degree of his supervision, and supervision within
this category may change from intensive to active.29 The purpose be-
hind the designation of a case as sensitive is one of record keeping, i.e.,
of allowing the field authorities to keep an up-to-date list of their
potentially most dangerous parolees.
General Rules of Parole Supervision. The New York Legislature
has established only the very basic conditions which may be included
in a parole agreement devised by the Board of Parole.80 These con-
24 Active supervision requires a parolee to report on a monthly basis, subject to re-
duction by his officer to a reporting basis of up to but not exceeding every two months,
and requires a parole officer to make a minimum of one home visit per month, and one
employment check every two months. Id. § 204(I)(B).
25Id. § 204(l)(C).
26 See text accompanying note 112 infra.
27 Sensitive cases are also referred to as Red Folder cases. FIx.u PAROLE § 204 (I)(C).
28 Crimes fitting this description include: gangsterism, racketeering, confidence opera-
tions and sexual offenses. For certain sexual offenses the sensitive classification is manda-
tory. Id.
29Id.
80 N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1972). But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 123.20 (Supp. 1973), and 30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:123.20 (1964), which stipulate no required
or recommended provisions in compiling general parole regulations. See also FrNAL REPORT
OF THE U.. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORm OF FEDERAL C AL LAW § 3404 (1971),
which takes the position that there is little to be gained by setting out permissible condi-
tions of parole in a statute.
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ditions stipulate that: the parolee shall not leave the state without the
consent of the Board; he shall live in a suitable domicile; he shall
support himself and his dependents; he shall make restitution31 for
his crime; he shall give up his evil ways and associates; he shall under-
go any necessary treatment for drug addiction; and he will follow the
direction of his parole officer.32
With the above recommended rules serving as a guide, the Board
of Parole has the power to adopt the general rules of parole, and add
any specific rules to govern a particular case.3a The New York courts
have given the Board great leeway in formulating conditions of pa-
role.84 The sole limitation imposed by the courts on parole conditions
is that the Board cannot provide for conditions that are illegal.35 An
example of an illegal condition is any attempt by the Parole Board
on its own initiative to impose a condition which would enlarge the
parolee's sentence, thereby encroaching upon the power of the legis-
lature and the authority of the courts.8
The single outstanding point to be made concerning the constitu-
tionality and legality of parole conditions is that this topic has not
received the clarification or stringent legal analysis which results from
frequent litigation. With the exception of the issues of search and
seizure and freedom of speech and assembly,3 7 the conditions of parole
SlNeither the Parole Board nor the judiciary has defined what the requirement of
restitution involves.
32 N.Y. CoRuEc. LAW § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
83 Id.
840chs v. La Valle, 60 Misc. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. Clinton County 1968), modified, 60 Misc.
2d 629 (Sup. Ct. Clinton County), afJ'd, 33 App. Div. 2d 80, 307 N.Y.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't
1969). The Parole Board may require psychiatric care as a condition of parole if it deems
such condition advisable. People v. Ainsworth, 32 App. Div. 2d 839, 302 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d
Dep't 1969).
85 People ex tel. Ingenito v. Warden, 267 App. Div. 295, 46 N.Y.S.2d 72 (4th Dep't
1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 803, 59 N.E.2d 174 (1944).
36 Id.
87 The parolee's right to freedom of speech and assembly has been the subject of
recent review in the federal courts. See Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (NJ). Cal.
1970), where petitioner, a California state parolee, was denied permission by his parole
officer to address a University of California student rally on conditions at Soledad prison.
Fear of student-sponsored demonstrations outside the prison apparently was the reason
given for denial of permission. The district court ruled that the Parole Board had not
made a necessary showing of clear and present danger arising from the speech. The court
determined that the permission-seeking procedures used in California would "inevitably
involve a scrutiny by the parole officers concerned of the proposed content of petitioner's
proposed speeches." Id. at 750. The court found "this would have an unwarranted chill-
ing effect on the exercise by plaintiff of his undisputed rights". Id.
Similar legal issues were raised in Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
involving the attempts of federal parolee Morton Sobell, to participate in peace demon-
strations in Washington and to speak out on prison conditions at a banquet sponsored by
a newspaper identified with the Communist Party. The District of Columbia Parole Board
[Vol. 48:1
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have to a great degree remained unchallenged. For example, the con-
dition requiring a parolee to receive permission before marrying may
be of questionable validity, as it is arguably violative of the principles
of Loving v. Virginia,38 which speaks of marriage as one of the basic
rights of man. It is to be hoped that more public interest in prisoners'
rights will result in better development of the law as it pertains to
parole conditions.
The trend in New York and other states has been to increase
rather than decrease the number of general conditions rigidly applied
to all parolees. 9 The theory behind this increase in rules stems from
an apparent belief on the part of correctional authorities that since the
courts have shown increased concern for prisoner and parolee rights, it
may now be necessary to prove in court that specific regulations have
been violated in order to revoke parole. The more specific the regu-
lation, the easier it is to prove a violation. Thus, at least to some de-
gree, parole rules are designed not to induce a stable and safe re-
habilitation period for parolees, but to facilitate revocation of parole.
General Rules Governing Parole in New York40
I. I will proceed directly to the place to which I have been
paroled (spending funds only for necessities) and within
twenty-four hours, I will make my arrival report to the Divi-
sion of Parole.
2. I will not leave the State of New York or the community to
which I have been paroled without the written permission of
my parole officer 4
3. I will carry out the instructions of my parole officer, report
refused Sobell's request, justifying its decision on information that violence might occur
at the peace demonstrations and that speaking at a banquet of a paper closely associated
with the Communist Party would be incompatible with Sobell's rehabilitation. The dis-
trict court decreed that before the Board could place restrictions on Sobell's rights of free
speech and assembly, it had first to show a substantial and compelling interest which re-
quired the restrictions. Any reasons the Board might put forward in such a case would be
subject to rigid scrutiny. The court concluded that in the instant case the Board had
failed to show that its action was necessary "to safeguard against specific, concretely de-
scribed and highly likely dangers of misconduct by [the parolee] himself." Id. at 1506.
38 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
39 See Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules - Thirteen Years Later, 15 CIuM. & DELINQ.
267 (1969). As opposed to the 15 extensive parole conditions New York applies to each
parolee, the English Criminal Justice Act of 1967 requires a parolee to do five things:
(1) report to an office indicated; (2) place himself under the supervision of an officer
nominated for this purpose; (3) keep in touch with his officer in accordance with the
officer's instructions; (4) inform his officer at once if he changes his address or loses his
job; and (5) be of good behavior and lead an industrious life. Id. at 274.
40 Information supplied to the McKay Commission by the Division of Correctional
Services.
41 In New York City, a parolee needs verbal permission to travel to Nassau County.
FELD PAROLE § 224.00(A).
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as directed and permit him to visit me at my residence and
employment. I will not change my residence or employment
without first securing the permission of my parole officer. I
understand that I am in the custody of the Board of Parole.
I hereby consent to any search of my person, my residence
or of any property or premises under my control which the
Board of Parole or any of its representatives may see fit to
make at any time in their discretion.
4. I will make every effort to maintain gainful employment
and if for any reason I lose my employment I will immediately
report this fact to my parole officer and will cooperate with
him in his efforts to obtain employment for me. I will lead
a law-abiding life and will conduct myself as a good citizen.
I understand that this means I must not associate with evil
companions or any individual having a criminal record,42
that I must avoid questionable resorts, abstain from wrong-
doing, lead an honest, upright and industrious life, support
my dependents, if any, and assume towards them all my moral
and legal obligations, and that my behavior must not be a
menace to the safety of my family or to any individual or
group of individuals.
5. I will avoid the excessive use of alcoholic beverages. I will
abstain completely if so directed by my parole officer.
6. I will not live as man and wife with anyone to whom I am not
legally married 43 and I will obtain written permission from
my parole officer before I apply for a license to marry.4
7. I will surrender to my parole officer immediately after release
any motor vehicle license which I have and will not apply for
any motor vehicle license or own an automobile without the
permission of my parole officer.
8. I will not purchase, own or possess firearms of any nature.
9. I will not carry from the institution from which I am released,
or send to any correctional institution, any written or verbal
message, or any object or property of any kind, unless I have
obtained proper permission.
10. I will reply promptly to any communication from a member
42 Recognizing the need to make parole regulations realistic in operation, the National
Conference on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has suggested that the new Federal
Criminal Code omit the rule that a parolee must not associate with persons engaged in
criminal activities or having criminal records. FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. NAT'L COMM'N
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW § 3404 (1971).
43 Prior to 1971, rule 6 included a provision that the parolee "[w]i not have sexual
relations with anyone not [his] lawful spouse."
44 An example of the attempt of the Board of Parole and Department of Correctional
Services to impose their moral philosophy on the parolee appears in the Parole Officer's
Field Manual which states: "It is the intent of the law that marriage be a permanent
institution." The Manual further advises the officer that prior to the granting of permis-
sion to marry that officer should interview both parties with this philosophy in mind.
Fr.LD PARoLE § 206.01.
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of the Board of Parole, a parole officer or other authorized
representative of the Board of Parole.
11. I understand that any reports, either verbal or written, made
to or submitted by me to my parole officer, which are sub-
sequently found to be false, will be rejected.by the Board of
Parole, and in addition may be considered a violation of
parole.
12. I will immediately report to my parole officer each and every
time I am arrested or questioned by officers of any law enforce-
ment agency.
13. I will not register or vote in any election as my right of fran-
chise was revoked when I was sentenced to a State Prison.45
This does not apply if I was given a reformatory sentence.
14. I understand that I may not accept employment in any
capacity where alcoholic beverages are made or sold,.without
the written approval of the State Liquor Authority where nec-
essary, and my parole officer.
15. Should the occasion arise, I will waive extradition and will not
resist being returned by the Board of Parole to the State of
New York.46
16. Special Conditions (May be imposed by the Board of Parole).
New York's general rules of parole in the main resemble those in
operation in many other states. The requirements that a parolee seek
permission for out-of-county and -state travel, maintain gainful em-
ployment, have the consent of his parole officer before changing em-
ployment, abstain from any undesirable associations, and secure the
consent of his parole officer to marry, mirror provisions in operation
in most jurisdictions.47 Two provisions of New York's general parole
rules stand in sharp contrast to those prevailing nationally. New York
is one of only three states48 which makes searches of a parolee's person
and property compulsory. Sixteen states provide only for compulsory
visits by the parole officer, and in 31 other jurisdictions there is no
written rule. Second, New York is one of only four states that prohibits
suffrage among parolees.40
45 But see Laws of New York 1971, ch. 310, which provides for automatic restoration
of voting rights of convicted persons upon discharge from parole or maximum expiration
of sentence.
48 See Tennessee ex rel. Lea v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933), cert.
denied, 292 U.S. 638 (1934), and Ex parte Casemento, 24 N.J. Misc. 345, 49 A.2d 437 (1946),
which determined that the parolee's consent to the conditions of parole may constitute a
waiver of the right to oppose extradition. The basis of extradition of a parolee is the
crime for which he was originally convicted, not the violation of parole he commits by
fleeing.
47 Id. at 270. Arluke, supra note 39, at 267.
48 Colorado and North Carolina are the others. Id. at 270-71.
49 Illinois, Nevada, and Ohio also deny parolees the right to vote. Id.
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Special Conditions of Parole. The sixteenth provision of the
parole conditions requires that the parolee will follow, in addition to
the general rules, any specific conditions applied by the Board in his
particular case. Since the general rules of parole are applied to all
parolees, it is through application of special conditions that the Parole
Board attempts to deal with individual cases and problems. Unfor-
tunately, special conditions are a negative rather than positive ap-
proach to individualization. They are negative in orientation because
the conditions are denials of rights, i.e., no drugs, no alcohol, no motor
vehicle license, rather than positive grants of rights, such as stip-
ulating that the application of a particular general rule is counter-
productive to the rehabilitation of this specific parolee and therefore
unnecessary.
Rules Designated by Parole Officers. In addition to those condi-
tions applied by the Parole Board the individual parole officer may
add rules he thinks advisable in the individual case.50 These particular
conditions may take different forms but usually involve curfews 1 re-
quiring the parolee to be at his residence on and after a particular
hour, or economic controls forcing the parolee to report his expendi-
tures in detail.52 There is little or no control over an individual parole
officer's use of such "Deliquency Control Techniques" 3 as curfew.
Supervisory approval is either not necessary or perfunctory in its
application. 4
Unwritten Rules of Parole. Supplementing the four types of rules
discussed above is a fifth class of rules, the unwritten rules of parole,
that play a part in the general scheme of parole supervision. Although
there are no statutory provisions or sections in a field manual that
refer to the unwritten rules, they are important because parole officers
freely admit their existence, and parolees "know they exist"5 5 and
change their behavior in reference to them.
One of the "unwritten rules" that the McKay Commission at-
50 Interview with Irving Sokoloff, Supervising Parole Officer, New York State Depart-
ment of Correctional Services, in New York City, March 25, 1972, on file at St. John's
Law Review. Officer Sokoloff states that an officer by establishing a rigid system of his own
rules can easily "break a parolee," that is, force him to violate his parole.
51 The use of a curfew is suggested as a disciplinary tool. Ft~rZ PARoLE § 205.03.
52 Id. § 205.01. Economic controls can include a Bank Control Agreement authorizing
the bank to refer all withdrawals from a parolee's account to the Department of Correc-
tional Services for approval before releasing any funds. Id. § 205.01(3).
53 Id. § 205.02(d). Additional Delinquency Control Techniques include police coopera-
tion, night visits, surveys, plants and tailing.
54 Interview with Irving Sokoloff, supra note 50.
55 Attica inmate interviews conducted by McKay Commission, January through March
1972, on file with McKay Commission.
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tempted to document was the claim that if a parolee asked of his
parole officer some type of special permission, he then had a greater
chance of being revoked than if he had not requested such permission.
Statistics obtained by the McKay Commission56 indicate that approxi-
mately 51 percent of the parole violations in the Commission's sample
had, prior to their revocations, requested special dispensations from
their officers. The Commission had planned to draw firmer conclu-
sions from this data by comparing it with data culled from a sample of
400 former Attica inmates who are now on parole in New York. Un-
fortunately, the lack of response by these parolees made comparative
data impossible.57
Functions of the Rules of Parole. Approximately 90 percent of the
parole revocations in New York are based on the parolee's infringe-
ment of the technical rules governing parole, rather than on the com-
mission of a new criminal offense while under supervision.58 If the
parole system is to function effectively, all those whose parole had
been revoked should have engaged in conduct that would in some
manner imperil community safety, or evinced unwillingness to follow
procedures and rules designed to aid in rehabilitation, thereby indicat-
ing an unfitness for continued parole. In New York, both parole of-
ficers and parolees have expressed the view that a parolee would have
to be in a comatose state not to violate his parole rules in some re-
spect.5 9 Many of the technical violations are neither indications of po-
tential criminality nor conduct impairing the rehabilitative purposes
of parole. The imposition of these conditions simply restricts the
parolee's personal life for no other reason than to see if he can obey
orders.60
56 The data indicated that within the McKay Commission's sample group of 35 white
parole violators, 16 had sought special permission, e.g., to travel or change jobs, prior to
their parole revocation. Four parolees made 2 requests each, bringing the total number
of requests to 20. Thus, 46% of the white violators in this sample were those who requested
special permission. Within the sample of 26 minority group violators, 15, or 57%, were
characterized as having sought special permission from their parole officer.
57 Approximately 400 letters were mailed to former Attica inmates presently on parole
in New York State requesting that they be interviewed by the McKay Commission. When
only 12 parolees responded indicating a willingness to participate, the project was
abandoned.
58 See text accompanying note 146 infra.
50 Interviews with Jay Fellows, Donald Smith and George C. Record, Institutional
Parole Officers, at Attica Correctional Facility, March 16, 1972.
60 Harlan W. Eaton, a former Attica inmate expressed to the McKay Commission his
thoughts on the conditions of parole in a letter entitled, "An Essay on Lessening the
Burden." Eaton stated in part,
When the inmate is given parole... he is not treated in a manner to allow him
self-respect or human dignity. The rules are such that the parolee feels he is
treated more like a child. Not as a man or as a fellow human who has paid his
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The period of parole supervision should serve the positive func-
tion of forming a bridge between the abnormal prison environment
and community life. Certain rules of parole supervision, however, es-
pecially those relating to the supervision of moral behavior and daily
transactions of business, perpetuate albeit without bars an unnatural,
abnormal environment. In addition to serving no rehabilitative pur-
pose, such rules are no longer relevant to community standards of
behavior. Proliferation of such rules serving no rehabilitative or cus-
todial function create deep psychological fears and hostility in the
parolee who questions the need for such provisions and fears entrap-
ment if he violates them."1 When conditions of parole are neither rele-
vant to correctional needs and goals or to community standards, re-
adjustment becomes an increasingly difficult process for the parolee. 2
The rules governing parole supervision have also failed in the
rehabilitative process because the Board of Parole has not taken the
opportunity to tailor the rules to the individual parolee. The legisla-
ture, by proferring only the barest of recommended rules, has recog-
nized the leeway and discretion that the Parole Board needs in order
to operate with its heterogeneous population; and at least one courts
has supported the philosophy that the duty and degree of supervision
varies with the case histories of the individuals to be released. In opting
for the mandatory use of fifteen general rules, the scope of whose re-
strictions range from the denial of a drivers license64 (preventing a
parolee from working as a cab driver) to a prohibition against work-
ing in any business where liquor is sold,65 (thus barring a parolee from
work as a waiter) the Board of Parole has created a web of restrictions
that benumbs the parolee. The general rules of parole, universally
debt to society and only wants a reasonable chance to make it on the outside ....
The qualifications and restrictions that a parolee must abide by, are not only con-
fusing but petty. Rules that in most instances are quite juvenile ... Rules such
as no driving, no drinking, no sex, Il o'clock curfew goes against even the most
conservative thinker. In these moder days, can even the parole officer imagine
himself abiding by these archaic and stringent rules and regulations .... The
parolee is always reminded that this parole is a privilege and he had betternever forget it.
Letter from Harlan w. Eaton to McKay Commission, March 10, 1972, on ifie at St. John's
Law Review.01 The majority of Attica inmates who stated to the McKay Commission that theparole system was one of their chief grievances, gave as their reason the psychologicaldegradation accompa ying active parole supervision in New York. Commission researchindicated that it was not uncommon for parolees, because of their inability to abide bythe rules of parole, to request voluntarily that they be removed from active parole statusand returned to their correctional institution until their maximum sentence expired.
O2 See generally Note, Parole: Rights and Revocation, 87 BKa.YN. L Ray. 550 (1971).6I Taylor v. State, 86 App. Div. 2d 878, 820 N.Y.S.2d I4, 845 (Sd Dep't 1971).64See text accompanying note 40 supra.
65 See id.
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applicable to the State's parole population, should be reduced to four
or five basic conditions. Included among these conditions should be
the following: that the parolee must seek permission before traveling
out of state, that the individual must make every effort to secure gainful
employment, that the parolee will cease to associate with criminal
elements, and a formal recognition by the parolee that he is still under
the custody of the Board of Parole. Other prohibitions should be
added only as warranted by the individual case.
Immediate Post Release Supervision
Penologists and sociologists are in agreement that the most crucial
phase of parole supervision is the first six months after release, for it is
during this initial period of community contact that a large number
of violations occur. 60 In recognition of the need to establish immediate
post-release programs to strengthen chances for successful accommoda-
tion by the parolee on his return to the community, halfway houses
for newly released parolees have been established in a number of
jurisdictions. At present there are approximately 50 such programs
patterned on Synanon's use of halfway houses in drug rehabilitation. 7
The support for a number of halfway house programs has come
entirely from private groups," although the best approach appears to
be one that combines state financing with community involvement in
staff supervision and counseling. 9
New York has established a temporary emergency residential
facility7" in New York City for newly released parolees, and federal
66D. DaEssLER, PRACncE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (2d. ed. 1969); C.
Gr~anmi, THE PAor PocEss (1959). Half the parole violations occur within 6 months
after release. PRnsmwNT's CoMm'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JucE, TMKx FORCE REPORT: COaREcroNs 219 (1967).
67 Breslin & Crosswhite, Residential Aftercare: An Intermediate Step in the Correc-
tional Process, 27 FED. PROD. 37 (1963); Breslin & Crosswhite, Bridging the Gap from Con-
finement to Freedom, 23 FED. PROB. 46 (1959). The concept of halfway houses is not
restricted to parolees, but has seen wide use in the treatment of addicts and the rehabilita-
tion of former inmates who have completed their maximum prison terms.
68 Two of the most highly regarded halfway house programs operated by private
citizens are the Dismar House of Saint Louis established in 1959 by Rev. Charles Dismar
Clark and the St. Joseph's House of Hospitality in Pittsburgh, established by a private
group of attorneys. Advocates of private control and operation argue that it is only through
such private control that a stultifying institutional atmosphere can be avoided and pri-
vate citizens induced to contribute their time and effort. See Meiners, A Halfway House
for Parolees, 29 FED. PROB. 47, 51 (1965).
69 The "308" program in Delaware is an example of the effectiveness of joint state-
private effort. The facilities for the 808 program were made available by the state and
the federal government made a grant to help pay for the staff while the program was
staffed and run by private groups. Breslin S. Crosswhite, Bridging the Gap from Con-
finement to Freedom, 28 Fan. PROB. 46, 49 (1959).
70 F= . PAROLE § 101.06.
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funds have recently been made available71 to New York for an experi-
mental residential treatment center for 150 parolees.72 Since 1966 the
Department of Correction has been studying the feasibility of open-
ing a multi-purpose treatment center that would improve upon that
contemplated by most halfway houses. The proposed treatment center
would contain residential facilities for parolees, staff quarters, educa-
tional and vocational training facilities for residents and non-residents
and psychological, psychiatric and medical services.73 At present, how-
ever, neither the State alone, nor the State in conjunction with private
groups, has established the halfway houses necessary to improve the
parolees' chances for success in the crucial first six months.
As the result of problems in financing and securing suitable hous-
ing, plus the natural reluctance of Parole Boards to allow parolees to
take part in a program that is often in its embryonic stages, the num-
ber of parolees taking advantage of halfway house programs has been
small.74 However, those halfway house programs that have been in
operation for a number of years have had great success in slowing the
rate of recidivism among newly released parolees. 75 This achievement
is attributable to a number of factors, including the availability of
group counseling for psychological and employment difficulties, and
the opportunity for the parolee to conserve his financial resources
during this period of initial stress.
Supervision and the Establishment of a Social-Casework Relationship
After the initial interview, further personal interviews between
the parole officer and the parolee continue at frequent intervals.7 6 These
interviews are designed to establish and foster the development of a
social-casework relationship between officer and parolee in order to cre-
ate the atmosphere most conducive to rehabilitation.77 Although the
71 DEP'T OF CORRTIcnoNAL SERVICES, BUDGET REPORT, 233 (1971). The exact amount of
money specifically earmarked for this program is not stipulated in the Budget Report.
72 FACTS AND FiGuRs 1970 at 12.
73 See note 59 supra.
74 See note 67 supra.
75 See Meiners, supra note 68, at 50, 52. Halfway houses are not a panacea for the
problems that beset the system, but the St. Joseph's House of Hospitality, for example, has
been able to show a success rate far in excess of that experienced in the State of Penn-
sylvania as a whole. In the three year period the St. Joseph's House had approximately a
nine percent revocation rate compared to the state recidivism rate of approximately thirty
percent. Id. at 50.
76 The Department of Correctional Services confidently states, "Many parolees seek
the advice of their supervising parole officers even after completion of the period of
parole." N.Y. STATE DE,'r oF CoP"=xONAL SmvIcEs, FACTS AND FIGURES 1971 at 13 [herein-
after cited as FActs AND FIGutRas 1971].
77 It is the objective of the Division of Parole, through a continuous social case-
work program in the correctional facility and under parole supervision in the
community to provide each offender with the opportunity for constructive change
[Vol. 48:1
PAROLEE IN SOCIETY
Department of Correctional Services has stressed the need to establish an
effective social casework relationship between officer and parolee, there
are a number of factors which mitigate against achieving this goal, in-
cluding: the failure of the parties involved to regard their relationship
as one of social casework; the large caseloads of the field parole officers
which inhibit the establishment of any personal relationship, and the
nature of the tools available to the parole officer, which emphasize the
custodial at the expense of the social work and rehabilitative elements
of the relationship. At the core of this problem is the conflict caused
by the dual nature of the parole officer's function. Parole officers in
New York State have been placed by the Department of Correctional
Services into two often conflicting roles: officers serve simultaneously
both as social workers, with the job of helping the individual parolee
and as the community's guardians. Of these two roles, the latter un-
questionably has taken precedence.
The parole officer is a professional social caseworker who at no
time is permitted to put the rights of the individual parolee ahead
of the rights of society .... At all times he takes every necessary
precaution to insure the parolee's activities are not a threat to
society.7 8
How Officer and Parolee Regard the Role of Parole Officer. Any
attempt at a viable social work relationship between officers and pa-
rolees is handicapped because of the non-voluntary relationship be-
tween staff and client. 79 The parolee-parole officer link is by nature the
social anathema of a voluntary relationship.8 0
Based upon the information from interviews conducted by the
McKay Commission, it is clear that few, if any, parolees regard their
officers as social workers. Newly released parolees have received their
orientation about parole and parole officers not from any in-prison
orientation program of the Department of Correctional Services, but
from other inmates who have been revoked from parole. In many in-
stances, their expectations of parole are shaped by the "horror stories"
of parole violators. Once under active supervision, parolees see their
officer as one who has authority to, and often does, invoke sanctions
against them - not a role they associate with a social worker. Because
of the officer's disciplinary power, parolees regard him not as a repre-
. The provision of a program of social casework service ... is one of the most
important activities of the parole officer.
Id. at 16.
78 Id.
79 See H. PEnLMAN, SOCIAL CAsE.WORK 17 (1957).
80 See generally Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79 YALE L.J. 698
(1970).
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sentative of the State's interest in rehabilitation but as part of a
prosecution-police-parole triumvirate representing the State's interest
in criminal deterrence.
A third crucial factor militating against an effective casework re-
lationship is that the parole officers themselves do not look upon their
function as that of a social worker.81 Their official status is that of a
peace officer,82 and this is how they tend to regard their jobs. The field
parole officers are forced to work closely with police officers, whom
they regard as their natural ally. In addition, some officers measure
success through a result-oriented approach that concentrates solely on
the ultimate fate of the parolee; success is defined in terms of how
long a man is kept out of prison rather than in terms of any positive
rehabilitative steps.8 3
If the establishment of a social casework relationship between
officer and parolee is to succeed, the parole officer must not have to
choose between the goals of rehabilitation and control. Not until
parole officers are deprived of their authority to invoke sanctions will
the parolee, or the officers themselves, regard their function as re-
habilitative.
Supervision Caseload. Throughout New York State, parole of-
ficers shoulder large caseloads. In the calendar year 1970, there was at
all times a minimum of 12,156 parolees under supervision.84 A field
staff of 542, approximately one-seventh of whom were supervisory per-
sonnel, handled this caseload.85 Under the optimal conditions of the
minimum number of individuals under parole supervision and the
maximum effort exerted by all staff members, including supervisory
personnel, each officer86 was supervising a minimum of 22 parolees at
one time.
81 On a number of occasions, staff members of the McKay Commission were told by
field parole officers to disregard, as they themselves had come to disregard, the comments
and recommendations of institutional parole officers because they are "social work
oriented." See also N.Y. STATE Dm'T oF CoaREMTONs, ANNUAL REP ORT 1970 at 24 [herein-
after cited as 1970 ANNUAL REPORT], which notes that within all of the state's correctional
facilities there are social workers whose sole function is to receive voluntary requests for
social work assistance and make the necessary contacts in resolution of their problems.
82 Designation as peace officers permits parole officers to carry a gun. FMrD P~aoLE §
213.04.
83 See note 59 supra.
841970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 9. The maximum number of men under
supervision during the year was 18,560 while the average figure was 14,211.
85 Id. Supervisory personnel carry either a reduced caseload or no caseload at all.
86 Parole officers in New York do not use group counseling techniques that have
effectively been used in other jurisdictions to deal with the problems of large caseloads.
See generally Mandel & Parsonage, An Experiment in Adult-Group Parole Supervision,
11 Cims. & DEL Nq. 318 (1965), which analyzes a Minnesota study reporting that parolees
who had undergone group counseling experienced a higher success rate thal the general
parole community.
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In addition to the number of cases,87 a second index of the work-
load is the amount of actual time spent on supervision of parolees. The
critical determinant is the number of "contacts" made in the further-
ance of parole supervision. The term contact encompasses office inter-
views as well as home or employment visits. During 1970, the field
parole officers in New York made a total of 520,916 contacts,88 a figure
so large that it would mean that every working day, every field parole
officer, including supervisory personnel, made more than four super-
visory contacts in addition to their normal complement of office work
and investigations made in response to requests either by the Parole
Board or institutional personnel.
It is doubtful that the field parole officers can effectively perform
either their custodial or rehabilitative functions in light of their heavy
caseload and the amount of work demanded by each case. A direct
result of this difficult work load is that the parole officer and parolee
experience inadequate personal contact. And it is conceivable that
given the overburdened caseload, parole officers may be more willing
to seek revocation of parole in more troublesome cases.
Inadequate Training. The parole staff's insufficient training in-
hibits the development of any more than custodial supervision of
parolees. The majority of parole officers do not possess the skills neces-
sary to deal with the highly specialized problems resulting from ghetto
and drug cultures.8 9
In recognition of the fact that the majority of parole officers lack
the necessary educational background or job training, the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services has established specialized caseloads.
Officers assigned to these caseloads receive superior specialized train-
ing. For example, officers involved in the mental hygiene unit90 receive
87 THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 70 (1967), refers to 25 cases per officer as an average
caseload, and 20 cases per officer for special cases. For statistics concerning volume, cost and
staffing of the parole supervision process, see id. at 189-90.
88 1970 ANNUAL REPORT at 9. The numerical breakdown of the contacts for 1970 in-
dicates: 152,962 office interviews, 110,024 home visits, 17,942 employer visits, 55,681 other
visits and 184,307 other contacts.
89 N.Y. Coimcu. LAw § 9. (McKinney Supp. 1972), provides that in order to be eligible
for appointment as a parole officer one must be at least twenty-one years of age, possess
a high school degree and be physically, mentally and morally fit. In addition, the statute
allows the Commissioner of Correctional Services, acting in cooperation with the Board
of Parole and the Civil Service Commission, to establish additional standards to govern
selection and appointment of parole officers. Presently, parole officers are appointed by
thq Commissioner of Correctional Services from a list established by the State Civil Service
Commission.
90The Mental Hygiene Unit Caseloads, the first such specialized caseloads, were
established in 1967 to provide for superior supervision and treatment of parolees who
present emotionally disturbing problems. The parole officers involved received training
from psychiatric residents at Bellevue Hospital. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, 11-14.
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training from psychiatric residents. At present there are five special-
ized caseloads in operation in New York City: the mental hygiene unit,
the retarded offenders unit, the young male offenders unit, the gifted
offenders unit and the narcotics unit.91 However, while the training re-
ceived by the parole officers assigned to these specialized units is su-
perior, they must still bear an overburdened caseload schedule. In
1970, the 21 specialized narcotic parole officers in the New York City
area supervised 800 parolees who were under intensive supervision
because of histories of drug dependence.92
A Comparison of the Parole Officer's Power to Order Search and
Seizure and to Aid in Job Placement. A comparison of the power given
to the parole officers to effectuate their role as guardian of the com-
munity with the power they possess to further their role in the social
rehabilitation of a parolee is a further demonstration of the over-
whelming emphasis placed by the state on the custodial at the expense
of the rehabilitative. The broad search and seizure powers available
to parole officers to insure community safety, are in stark contrast to
the lack of tools available to secure employment for employees.
a. Search and Seizure. In his efforts to be the guardian of the
community, the parole officer keeps a close eye on the individual under
his supervision. Visits to the parolee's home are frequent and regular.
The parolee's employer is interviewed to determine how the parolee
is progressing in his job. The parole officer spot checks with law en-
forcement agencies for any possible illegal activities in which the
parolee may be suspected of engaging. Where necessary the parolee
may be placed under surveillance. 93
In their search for parole violations, parole officers are not bound
by ordinary limitations on search and seizure.94 The standard parole
91 Id. But cf. Czajkoski, Functional Specialization in Probation and Parole, 15 CRlM.
& DELINQ. 238 (1969), which attacks the idea of functional specialization.
92 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORREIONAL SERvicEs, ANNUAL REPORT 1971 at 13 [herein-
after cited as 1971 ANNUAL REPORT]. Compare with the recommended special caseload
figure, supra note 87.
93 Famu PAROLr.E § 205.02(5).
94 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.
1970) (rule excluding illegally seized evidence does not apply to parolees); People v.
Langella, 41 Misc. 2d 65, 68, 244 N.Y.S.2d 802, 805 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963) (the test
of reasonableness of search and seizure with respect to parolee is not the same as when
applied to person whose rights are not similarly circumscribed); People v. Randazzo, 37
Misc. 2d 80, 81, 234 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1962), aft'd, 20 App. Div.
2d 850, 248 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Ist Dep't), afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 526, 254 N.Y.S.2d 99, 202 N.E.2d 549
(1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). But cf. United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette,
418 F.2d 1319, 1322 n.7 (2d Cir. 1969), where the court stated that "[i]t is possible" that a
formulation whereby a search by a parole officer of the person, residence or effects of a
parolee is held not to be a violation of the fourth amendment is "too broad." A parolee
is said to be entitled to "some quantum of fourth amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." Id.
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agreement provides for the consent to any searches which the Board
of Parole or its representatives in their discretion may see fit to make
of the parolee's person, residence or any property or premises under
his control.95
While the courts permit special intrusion by a parole officer into
a parolee's privacy, his constitutional rights vis-it-vis the police remain
intact,90 and are entitled to the same protection as the constitutional
rights of others. Although regular police agencies are denied direct
use of search and seizure power of the magnitude available to the
parole authorities, that power belonging to the parole officer often
spills over the boundaries needed for proper parole supervision, to the
benefit of the police. A prime consequence of this spill-over is that if
a parole officer, while searching a parolee on suspicion of a parole vio-
lation, finds contraband or other evidence of a crime, the evidence
seized is admissible both in the subsequent parole revocation hearing
and in any criminal prosecution based on the evidence.97 Often the
police authorities take advantage of the search and seizure power of
parole officers by providing the parole officer with information point-
ing to a violation, accompanying him on his visit to the parolee, osten-
sibly to protect the parole officer, and then participating in the search.
This was the case in People v. Adams9" where the evidence seized was
admitted at the parolee's subsequent criminal trial. The admission of
95 Use of the extensive power of search and seizure is not based solely on the waiver
of rights secured in the parole agreement, but is supported by a number of legal theories
including: (1) that the entire parole process is an act of grace controlled by legislative
discretion rather than by constitutional necessity. See Marchand v. Director, United States
Probation Office, 296 F. Supp. 532, 534 (D. Mass. 1969); Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp 945
(D. Md. 1962). Adoption of this position means that parole is construed solely by the
standards provided by statute, which the parolee must accept with all its attendant restric-
tions, or not at all. Certain restrictions may be attacked as unwise, unnecessary or un-
generous, but they cannot be said to be unconstitutional. (2) that the test of reasonable-
ness of a search is not the same when applied to a parolee. People v. Santos, 31 App. Div.
2d 508, 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 976, 252 N.E.2d 861 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 US. 969 (1970); People v. Pelow, 59 Misc. 2d 424, 426, 299 N.Y.S.2d 20,
22 (Buffalo City Ct. 1969). (8) that extensive powers of search are dictated by a parole
officer's duty to supervise the parolee, People v. Langella, 41 Misc. 2d 65, 69, 244 N.Y.S.2d
802, 806 (Supreme Ct. Kings County 1963).
96See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.
1970).
97 United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1319, 1823 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'g
282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). However, with regard to the fourth amendment it may
be argued that it is reasonable and necessary if there is to be a system of parole to require
that a parolee give up some of the protection normally afforded by the fourth amend-
ment in order to effectuate the smooth operation of the parole system, but it is unrea-
sonable to force him to give up more than is required to insure that the objectives of the
parole system are met. Thus, a parole officer can make a search that intrudes upon a
parolee's privacy only to the extent that the search is necessary to confirm or deny a
suspicion that a parole violation has occurred, but any evidence he finds will not be
admissible in a criminal proceeding.
98 63 Misc. 2d 52, 310 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Schenectady County Ct. 1970).
1973]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the evidence was justified by the court on the grounds that the defend-
ant had consented to the search by parole officers and that the parole
officers had a duty to make the search.99
Once a parolee is arrested by the police for a crime the Parole
Board loses jurisdiction over him until he is returned to prison after
disposition of the charges. 100 Therefore, a parole officer cannot, after
an arrest, commit a search to discover evidence which the police had no
authority to seize or initially overlooked.
b. Employment Disability. The tools available to a parole officer
to deal with a parolee's employment problems are neither equal to the
task nor comparable in magnitude to the powers he possesses to search
and seize a parolee's property to ensure community safety.
Parolees encounter three obstacles in their efforts to secure employ-
ment. First, the general conditions of parole contain employment re-
strictions.10' Second, various business and licensing laws bar a person
convicted of a felony from being licensed or employed in a particular
business. 10 2 Third, the parolee's criminal record must be made known
99 Id. at 54, 56, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 7, 10. But see United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289,
291 (3d Cir. 1966), in which the court, in a strongly worded opinion, held that the mere
presence of a parole officer during a search does not legalize that search where the parole
officer is merely the agent of the police. A further recognition by the courts of possible
collusion between police and parole officers is elucidated in People v. Way, 65 Misc. 2d
865, 872, 319 N.Y.S.2d 16, 24 (Nassau County Ct. 1971), where the evidence seized by a
parole officer was held inadmissible in a general trial because the police who had bad the
defendant under observation as a robbery suspect called the parole officer and asked him
to cooperate in a search. It was apparent that the parole officer was not acting under his
own initiative; rather, the court emphasized that the search was instigated, initiated, di-
rected, arranged, controlled and participated in by the police and its prime purpose was
to further police investigation. In summation the court concluded:
With an awareness that parole officers and police officers may, and frequently do,
cooperate with each other, as for example, a policeman may make an arrest upon
a parole violation, or he may accompany a parole officer into a parolee's residence
for his protection . . . . The police officer may not, however, when lacking the
essential constitutional ingredient of probable cause to legally make a search by
virtue of his own right, induce a parole officer to search a parolee's home so that
he may accompany him and search for evidence of crime for use upon a prospec-
tive criminal prosecution.
Id. at 871-72, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
100 Le Clair v. Oswald, 21 App. Div. 2d 17, 19, 248 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (3d Dep't 1964);
People ex rel. Paqua v. Fay, 8 App. Div. 2d 856, 190 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd,
8 N.Y.2d 897, 168 N.E.2d 821, 204 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1960); Perillo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole,
4 App. Div. 2d 355, 358, 65 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (3d Dep't 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d. 1013, 1014,
152 N.E.2d 540, 541, 177 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1958).
101 In addition to the employment restrictions necessitated by surrender of drivers'
licenses and not working in any business where liquor is sold, the Division of Parole and
Community Services has established a list of generally disapproved areas of employment
which include poolrooms, racetracks, boxing, wrestling and employment on the New York
City waterfront. FIE= PARoLE § 211.0(C). The Division of Parole and Community Services
also frowns on self-employment by a parolee, both for the difficulty and hard work it
would involve for the parolee and because it would involve the use of special supervisory
techniques by the parole officer. FiLD PARoLE § 211.03.
102 E.g., junk dealers (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 61 (McKinney 1970)); private investiga.
tors or guards (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 74(2), 81(1) (McKinney 1970)); billiard room opera-
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to an employer 0 3 and may be considered by an employer in assessing
character and fitness of the applicant for the job sought.1' 4
In judging the response by the Department of Correctional Serv-
ices to employment difficulties two facts become apparent. First, the
Department has not successfully engaged in joint action with other
state agencies to broaden the scope of occupations in which parolees
may be successfully employed. The only liaison established to allow a
field parole officer to aid his parolee in securing employment is for
the purpose of selecting and processing parolees for certification and
licensing in barbering, hairdressing and cosmetology.10 5
Second, the parole officer has at his disposal no simple and effective
method of removing the statutory job disability from a parolee. The
two methods presently available for removal of statutory disabilities,
a Certificate of Relief from Disability and a Certificate of Good Con-
duct, have not proved effective on any large scale. A Certificate of Re-
lief from Disability is issued to an eligible offender 06 by the sentencing
court or by the Board of Parole if the offender has been sentenced to
prison.07 Granting of the Certificate is in the discretion of the court
or Board of Parole; it is not within the discretion or power of the parole
officer or supervising officer. A major handicap with the Certificate of
Relief from Disability is that the parolee must be a first offender. A
previous misdemeanor conviction, for example, will bar first felony
offenders from eligibility.
Persons not eligible for a Certificate of Relief from Disability may
tors (N.Y. GEN Bus LAw §§ 461, 467 (McKinney 1970)); attorneys (N.Y. JUDICARY LAW §
90(4) (McKinney 1970)); licensed cashiers of checks (N.Y. BANKInG LAW § 369(6) (McKinney
1971)); insurance adjusters (N.Y. INs. LAW § 123(9) (McKinney Supp. 1972)); and any job
where alcoholic beverages are involved (N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONTROL LAW § 102(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1972)). Restrictions are also placed on occupations such as auctioneers, pharmacists,
barbers, medical doctors, dentists, dental hygienists, certified public accountants, under-
takers and real estate brokers. For a discussion of the effect of a criminal conviction on
one's capacity to obtain a license see Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for
Occupational Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. Rxv. 533, 541-47 (1962).
103 The parole officer has the responsibility to make employers aware of the criminal
record and parole status of prospective employees. There are, however, certain situations
when this is not an automatic obligation, for example, where the parolee secures his job
through his own efforts and the nature of his criminal record does not present undue
risk to the particular employer. Flrn PAROLE § 211.0(D).
104 Under N.Y. CoRaRc. LAw § 701(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972), state agencies may rely
upon a past conviction as a basis for the exercise of discretion to refuse to employ or
license a parolee. Posner v. Kennedy, 20 Misc. 2d 231, 195 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1959); Tanner v. DeSapio, 2 Misc. 2d 130, 150 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga
County 1956); Falvey v. Hays, 205 Misc. 546, 133 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1954), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 879, 139 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ist Dep't 1955).
105 FiELD PAROLE § 207.04.
100 N.Y. Coanac. LAw § 700(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972). To be an eligible offender,
the prisoner must have had no more than one felony conviction. Id.
107 Id. § 701(l).
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apply for a Certificate of Good Conduct from the Board of Parole. The
Certificate will only be granted five years subsequent to the offender's
release from penal confinement or suspension of sentence. Even when
issued the Certificate may be granted to end a legal disability only if
it is provided by law that the Certificate will remove the disability in
question. The value of the Certificate is further diluted by the fact
that the issuance of Certificates of Good Conduct does not limit the
lawful discretion of any licensing board, body or authority, either to
grant or refuse a license, even though the person desiring the license
has been granted a Certificate of Good Conduct. The final determina-
tion as to licensing, employment or the right to practice a profession
remains in the discretion of the licensing body.
PAROLE REVOCATION
In New York State during 1970, more than one of every five per-
sons under parole supervision were declared delinquent by a member
of the Parole Board.108 The great majority of those declared delin-
quent, 77.8 percent, were returned to State Correctional facilities as
parole violators. 09 The figures for parole delinquency and revocation
have shown a steady percentage increase in the past thirteen years. 110
It can readily be seen from the above statistics that parole revoca-
tion procedures play a significant part in the overall criminal justice
system in New York State. To the parolees, the possibility of parole
revocation looms as a continuing threat of loss of freedom and return
to prison. Parole revocation also has considerable impact on society
as a whole; on the one hand, parole revocation procedures are de-
signed to protect society from offenders who cannot successfully cope
with parole, on the other, termination of parole interrupts the critical
transitional period between imprisonment and complete readjustment
to society as a free citizen. It is of crucial importance that New York
State's parole revocation procedures be carried out with efficiency,
rationality and fairness for the benefit of both the individual and the
community at large. Recent New York and Supreme Court decisions
have substantially expanded due process protections of parolees mov-
108 FACTS AND FIGURES 1970 at 27. The rate for a year period is calculated by dividing
the total number of parolees supervised during all or part of the year by the total number
of delinquencies. In 1970 there were 14,637 parolees under active supervision during all or
part of the year, and 3,086 declarations of delinquency.
109 Id. at 27-28.
110 Id. at 26. In 1961, the percentage of the parole population that had been declared
delinquent was 12%.
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ing through the revocation process, but the full impact of these deci-
sions probably has yet to be felt in New York State.
Before beginning a detailed evaluation of the New York Parole
revocation process, a few further statistics regarding parolees subjected
to this procedure may help to bring out the scale and impact of parole
revocation in this state.
The parolee facing possible revocation is likely to be one re-
leased to parole supervision under conditional release status. Condi-
tional releases violate their parole at a higher rate than parolees re-
leased to parole by action of the Board of Parole.:' n The parolee is
most likely to be placed in delinquent status and be brought before
the Board during his first full year under parole supervision." 2 The
M Id. at 27.
112 Id. at 27-28.
YEARLY RATE OF REVOCATION FOR PAROLEES RELEASED
TO PAROLE SUPERVISION IN 1.965
20%
Years of 1st .yr.
Release after
release
2nd yr.
after
release
3rd yr.
after
release
4th yr.
after
release
5th yr.
after
release
This information was supplied to the McKay Commission by William C. Baker of the
Department of Correctional Services. The 61 parole violators studied by the McKay Com-
mission sample spent an average of 7.3 months under supervision before revocation.
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parole violator is likely to have violated the conditions of parole on
previous releases. 113
Parolees convicted of a new crime while on parole supervision
comprise an extremely small percentage of those returned to prison
each year as violators. The figures for the period 1961-1970 indicate an
average of less than two percent of those individuals revoked from parole
in each year had committed a new crime while under community super-
vision.114 For example, in 1969,115 a total of 2,553 parolees were re-
turned to prison in New York State. A categorial breakdown of this
group indicates that 676 were returned because of purely technical
violations, 309 were returned because of absconding, 1,314 were re-
113 The McKay Commission's sample study of parole violators indicate that the major-
ity of men were repeat violators.
Previous Parole
1. Never Before Paroled 24
2. On Parole Once Before 18
a. Violated Once 13
3. On Parole Twice Before 11
a. Violated Once 4
b. Violated Twice 7
4. On Parole Three Times Before 3
a. Violated Once 0
b. Violated Twice 0
c. Violated Three Times 3
5. On Parole Four Times Before 3
a. Violated Once 0
b. Violated Twice 0
c. Violated Three Times 2
d. Violated Four Times 1
6. On Parole More Than Four Times 2
a. Violated More Than Four Times 2
Thus, of the 37 previous paroles only 5 had been successful.
114 PAROLEES RETURNED TO NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES WITH NEv SENTENCES AS FELONY OFFENDERS*
No. of Parolees Returned % of Total Group
to State Facilities Revoked
Year as Convicted Felons" From Parole
1961 209 1.5
1962 222 1.5
1963 256 1.7
1964 251 1.7
1965 212 IA
1966 205 1.3
1967 219 1.3
1968 184 1.1
1969 254 1.6
1970 264 1.8
* This information was supplied to the New York State Special Commission on Attica
by the Department of Correctional Services.
0
* These figures do not include those convicted of misdemeanors in New York and
other states.
115 FACTS AND FIGuRES 1970 at 27-28.
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turned because of new arrests which resulted in no new commitment
by the court, and 254, or 1.6 percent of the total, were returned for new
arrests which resulted in new conviction and commitment.
Procedure for Parole Revocation
New York's parole revocation process comprises a series of steps
taken by the Department of Correctional Services and the Parole
Board: (1) to arrest and temporarily reincarcerate the parolee; (2) to
bring charges against him for violations; (3) to collect and present
evidence as to his alleged parole violation; and finally, (4) to determine
whether the parolee will be returned to the correctional institution or
returned to community supervision.
The New York Correction and Penal Laws provide a broad and
rather vague framework within which the parole revocation process
is carried out.116 These statues outline in broad stroke the declaration
of delinquency when there is reasonable belief that a parolee has vio-
lated the conditions of his parole, the personal hearing before the
Board that follows a declaration of delinquency and the Board's deci-
sion either to return the parolee to the supervision of his officer or re-
turn him to prison. These statutory requirements are supplemented
by court interpretations and by the Manual for Field Parole Officers
used by the Department of Correctional Services to instruct and guide
parole officers in the daily process involved in the supervision and
revocation of a parolee.
The essential steps in New York's parole revocation procedures
are summarized below as they existed in June, 1972.117
The initial impetus for the parole revocation machinery occurs
when a parole officer has reasonable cause to believe one of the parolees
116 N.Y. CoRumc. LAw § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972); id. § 216 (McKinney 1968),
outline the course of conduct that the Board of Parole and the Department of Correc-
tional Services must take when there is reasonable belief that violations of parole on
conditional release have occurred. Section 216 provides the framework for the issuance of
detention warrants and the actual temporary detention of the alleged parole violator.
Section 212(7) provides that the Board of Parole shall at the first available opportunity
permit the alleged violator to appear personally before a three member panel at a state
correctional institution in order to explain the alleged violation, and the Board shall
within a reasonable time make a determination either by revoking parole or dismissing
the charge.
N.Y. PFNAL LAw § 70.40(3) (McKinney 1971), states when and to what extent the
tolling of a parolee's sentence is affected by a violation. These statutory provisions are
augmented by 7 N.Y. CODES, RULES AND REGS., §§ 1.16-1.19 (1971), which discuss the proper
proceedings on violation of parole, including issuance of warrants, procedure on new
arrest and violation appearances at state operated correctional facilities.
117 The change in the parole revocation process occasioned by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), will be discussed in detail in
the text accompanying footnotes 152-185, 214-218.
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he supervises has violated the conditions of his parole, or has lapsed or
is about to lapse into criminal conduct."" The parole officer then con-
sults with a senior parole officer; collectively, they decide either simply
to file a misconduct report since the infraction is not considered serious
or alternatively, where a serious violation appears to have occurred,
to issue a detention warrant signed by someone of at least the rank of
a senior parole officer. If a warrant is issued, the parolee is tem-
porarily detained pending a final decision. 119 Within seven days after
the detention warrant is issued a parole violation report prepared by
the parole officer and signed by the senior parole officer is filed with
a member of the Parole Board.120 This report contains the parole of-
ficer's observations, specific charges, the parolee's defenses or explana-
tion of the charges, and, if applicable, the statement of the arresting
officer. The Parole Board member reviews the report and if any rea-
sonable basis for the charge exists, makes a formal declaration of de-
linquency; this declaration is merely a statement of fact that the parolee
is no longerin the constructive custody of the Parole Board and not a
punitive determination. 121 In addition, the Board member may recom-
mend: (1) cancellation of the delinquency status, (2) return to com-
munity supervision, or (3) the Board member may feel that the viola-
tion report is an inadequate basis for making a decision and withhold
recommendation until further investigation.
At this point in the parole revocation process the parolee is in-
carcerated, either at the institution to which he was sent under the re-
turn warrant, or to the place where he was detained under the orig-
inal detention warrant. He has been charged and given a chance to
respond to the charges in the parole violation report. This report has
been reviewed by a single Parole Board member who has recommended
how he believes the case should be resolved.
118 N.Y. CoaREc. LAW § 216 (McKinney 1968). The Department of Correctional Services
has given meaning to the words "[vliolated the conditions of his parole in an important
respect . . . " by emphasizing that a parole officer must give careful thought to a viola-
tion of parole report. No report should be submitted solely for the purpose of getting
rid of a problem.
If there is some improvement in the parolee's situation over that which existed
prior to his sentence, unless he had violated his parole in a very serious manner,
the parole officer should not suggest his return before considerable effort has been
made to affect a readjustment. This, however, would not prevail if the parolee
constituted an actual serious risk in the community.
FIELD MANUAL § 215-01(3).
119 A parolee has no right to bail when he is detained by reason of lawful action of
the Board of Parole pending ultimate determination of a charge that he has violated
parole. Hardy v. Warden, 56 Misc. 2d 332, 335, 288 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1968).
120 Sokoloff, supra note 50.
121 See note 153 infra.
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Reasonable Cause for Issuance of a Detention Warrant
In order to issue a detention warrant for the suspected parole
violate, the parole officer and his supervisor must have "reasonable
cause" to believe that the parolee has either violated the conditions
of parole, lapsed into criminal ways, or is about to lapse into criminal
ways.122 The New York courts have given the parole officer and the
senior officer with whom he consults, broad discretion in determining
what constitutes reasonable cause. The Court of Appeals held, in
People ex tel. Natoli v. Lewis, 123 that in determining the question of
the power of a parole officer to issue a detention warrant after arrest
of the parolee on a criminal charge, a reviewing court could not go
behind the warrant to determine whether reasonable cause was pres-
ent.124 The court asserted that once the parole officer finds reasonable
cause, there is no power vested in the Parole Board to prevent the is-
suance of a mandatory warrant.125 The court concluded that the reason-
able cause standard for a parole detention warrant is far less stringent
than the standard of guilt necessary for an initial criminal arrest, rea-
soning that the power to issue a detention warrant stems from the
parolee's original conviction and not for the new alleged crime for
which the parolee is presumed innocent. 126 Consistent with the rea-
soning of the Natoli case, the New York Court of Appeals has recently
held that reasonable cause to issue a warrant existed, where the parole
officer, though not actually visiting the prisoner's home, had received
information from the police that the parolee was suspected of a rob-
bery and was not to be found at his home.127
Once reasonable cause has been found, the detention warrant
must be issued and signed by someone of at least the rank of senior
parole officer. In exigent circumstances only, an emergency warrant
effective for up to twenty-four hours may be issued by a parole of-
122 FACTS AND FiouREs 1970 at 24.
123 287 N.Y. 478, 481, 41 N.E.2d 62 (1942), rev'g 262 App. Div. 347, 29 N.Y.S.2d 544
(3d Dep't 1941). In the case of United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1319
(2d Cir. 1969), aft'g 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), Judge Hays, speaking for the Second
Circuit stated that the issuance of a detention warrant for parolees did not depend on a
showing of probable cause, and those procedural safeguards sufficient in the case of a
parolee would not be adequate in the arrest of an ordinary citizen. 418 F.2d at 1322.
124 287 N.Y. at 481, 41 N.E.2d at 64.
125 Id. at 481, 41 N.E2d at 64.
126 Id. at 482, 41 N.E.2d at 64. Thus, a detention warrant once having been issued
with reasonable cause cannot be lost because of a subsequent finding that the guilt of the
crime charged was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.
127 People v. Simons, 22 N.Y.2d 53, 240 N.E.2d 22, 293 N.YS.2d 521 (1968). Judge
Keating, concurring, noted that the statements of the parolee's alleged accomplices would
be insufficient to convict the parolee of robbery but would be sufficient to sustain a revo-
cation of parole, thus justifying holding the defendant without beginning formal criminal
procedures. Id. at 543, 240 N.E.2d at 27, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
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ficer without the authority of a senior parole officer.12 Such a warrant
is regarded as an extreme measure and issued only in rare instances
where circumstances require immediate action. 129 Certain temporal
constraints are placed on the issuance of a detention warrant. Speci-
fically, if a warrant is issued after the expiration of a prisoner's maxi-
mum sentence, this warrant is ineffective. 130 However, if a warrant is
issued and delivered to the police for execution before expiration of
the maximum sentence, it is valid even though not actually executed
until after such time.131 It is a general rule that unless due diligence
is exercised by parole authorities in issuing and executing detention
warrants, the violation is waived and jurisdiction lost.132 Due diligence
was not exercised where the warrant was issued eight months after
the alleged violation and was not executed until 16 months after that
violation, 21 days after expiration of the maximum sentence. 33
If the parole officer and his superior determine that a warrant
should not be issued, the matter may be dropped if the reasonable be-
lief of parole violation arises from the parole officer's suspicions or
observations. In those cases where reasonable cause arises from the
arrest of the parolee by the police, it is the responsibility of the parole
officer to prepare a misconduct report when no warrant is issued.134
The determination of reasonable cause and the issuance of a de-
tention warrant are primarily administrative matters left in the hands of
parole officers. The courts have neither interfered with this deter-
mination nor allowed this determination to be subject to review by
a parole board member. It is clear that administrative efficiency has
been deemed to outweigh the need for safeguards to the parolee. And
1287 N.Y. CoDEs, RULES & REGS. § 1.17(a) (1971), provides that a warrant can only be
issued by a "Board member or a designated officer." The term "designated officer" includes
senior parole officers, officers of the Department of Correctional Services holding a title
above senior parole officer, and any officer who is designated by a superior to act in any
of the prescribed titles. See also People v. Way, 65 Misc. 2d 865, 319 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971), which held that the authority to execute a detention warrant belongs
to the police as well as parole officers.
129 Sokoloff, supra note 50.
130 People ex rel. La Placa v. Heacox, 238 App. Div. 217, 220, 263 N.Y.S. 407, 410 (4th
Dep't 1933).
131 Id.
132 People ex rel. Grosso v. Additon, 185 Misc. 670, 671, 59 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1945).
133 Id. In People v. Valle, 7 Misc. 2d 125, 164 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y.C. Ct. Special Sessions
1957), the court held that the failure to execute a warrant from December 26, 1956 to
March 15, 1957, seven days after the probation period had ended, without either showing
in the record that the appellant was hiding or evading service of the warrant or was
incarcerated after a conviction for another crime on offense, is tantamount to a waiver of
the parolee's failure to report to his probation office.
134 FRELD PARoLE § 215.
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while the effect of the reasonable cause determination in itself is not
a final decision to revoke parole, the immediate impact on the parolee
is one of arrest and reincarceration. This complete concentration of
decision-making power among parole officers, without recourse to some
independent authority, raises the possibility of abuse.
The Parole Violation Report and Initial Review
The parole violation report which is filed with a member of the
Parole Board within seven working days after the issuance of the de-
tention warrant, is designed to serve as a documentation of all informa-
tion relevant to the case.135 Apart from the personal appearance of the
parolee and the calling of witnesses before the Parole Board, this report
serves as the sole factual basis upon which a final decision will be
rendered.
The report consists of the general history and background of the
parolee, including a history of the parole supervision and the parolee's
general adjustment to parole, the delinquency date,136 the circum-
stances and nature of the violation in terms of specific charges, and the
police officer's statement or affidavit if the parolee was arrested by the
police.137 The report will also contain the details of the violation with
an explanation, elaboration and proof of charges, the parolee's state-
ment, 38 which may include defenses and explanations of the charges,
the present status of the case, indicating the whereabouts and status
of the parolee, and the original detention warrant. 39
The parole violation report is written by the field parole officer but
must be countersigned by the senior parole officer.' 40 In the New York
City area, the report is routinely reviewed and signed by a supervising
parole officer.' 41 At the conclusion of the violation report, each parole
officer who has signed the report will make a terse recommendation
either to "restore" the parolee to supervision or "return" him to the
correctional institution.142
135 7 N.Y. CoDEs, RuL.s &. REGS. § 1.17(b) (1971).
136 In setting the delinquency date, it is the parole officer's duty to select the earliest
date that can be maintained. Sokoloff, supra note 50.
137 When a new crime is allegedly committed by a parolee, the parole officer respon-
sible for that parolee does not make an independent investigation but relies on information
supplied by the police. Sokoloff, supra note 50.
138 FIELD PAROLE § 215.01.
'39 Id.
140 Id. § 216.
141 Id.
142 Id. § 215.01(G). The parole officer may express his opinion concerning disciplinary
or delinquency action. However, the recommendation must not be stated so as to preclude
any action by a Board member. For example, according to the Department of Correctional
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Types of Violations. The parole violation report may contain alle-
gations of one or more of three types of violations, classified as New
Arrest, Technical Violation and Absconding.143 A new arrest involves
the arrest of a parolee for any kind of new offense. 44 A technical vio-
lation involves infractions of the 15 standard rules and regulations
of parole or of any additional stipulated parole conditions. 14 5 Abscond-
ing occurs when a parolee has been absent from his approved parole
residence for a protracted period of time and a subsequent investiga-
tion fails to locate him.
Data collected by the McKay Commission at Attica indicates that
parole is most frequently revoked for technical violations.
FIGURE 1:
TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF VIOLATIONS WHICH ENDED LAST PAROLE OF 1971146
Whites Blacks P.R. Indians Total
1. Technical Violation Only 13 8 0 1 22
2. Technical Violation &
Suspicion of Crime 3 3 0 0 6
3. Technical Violation & Crime 0 6 1 0 7
4. Absconding Only 8 1 2 1 12
5. Absconding & Suspicion
of Crime 1 0 0 0 1
6. Absconding & Crime 4 1 0 0 5
7. New Crime 2 1 0 0 3
8. Suspicion of Crime
(no charge brought) 3 1 0 0 4
The parole violation report usually contains more than one
violation.147 This is especially true when a new crime has been com-
mitted, since the Department of Correctional Services has emphasized
Services, the following presentation is acceptable: "It is the opinion of the parole officer
that further leniency may result in recidivism or absconding. It is, therefore, suggested
that consideration be given to the return of the parolee to prison." The following presen-
tation is unacceptable: "It is impossible to supervise or control the parolee and, therefore,
he should be returned to prison." Id.
143 Id. § 215.
144Id. § 215.01(2). If a new offense were committed in another state that offense
would have to be considered as a felony in New York in order for full application of
revocation procedures. See People ex reL King v. Morhous, 286 App. Div. 925, 142 N.Y.S.2d
672 (3d Dep't 1955) (mem.), citing that section.
45 See People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1971), where the court determined among other things that the Parole Board had
unlimited discretion in determining whether technical violations would be sufficient to
return a parolee to prison.
146 The figures for the New York State Correctional System as a whole indicate that
the majority of delinquencies in any one year are for technical violations and absconding.
In 1971 less than 10% of the parolees whose parole was revoked had been convicted of
new felony offenses while under community supervision. FACTs AND FxGURS 1971 at 24.
147 FIELD PAROLE § 215.01(E)(1).
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to its parole officers the great importance of listing all possibile vio-
lations in order to protect the Board's freedom of action should the
parolee be acquitted from the new criminal charge and seek a writ for
release from continued detention. 148 For example, if a parolee is charged
with robbery committed while he was intoxicated and in the early
hours of the morning, the intoxication and late hours are charged sep-
arately to strengthen the position of the parole authorities. Similarly,
when a parolee absconds, the fact that he failed to report, left his
residence without permission and quit his job are reported as sep-
arate counts.
Review by Board Member. The completed and approved viola-
tion report is sent to a single Parole Board member for initial review
and recommendation. If reasonable basis for the charges exist, the
Board member makes a formal declaration of delinquency which is
merely a statement of fact that the parolee is no longer in constructive
custody of the Parole Board and is not a punitive determination.149
Following issuance of the formal delinquency declaration and an ex-
amination of the report, the Board member will recommend one of
the three possible actions to be taken on the basis of the violation
report. 15 0 If the Board member recommends that the parolee be re-
turned to the correctional facility for detention until his case is re-
viewed by a three-member Parole Board panel, the Board member will
issue a return warrant ordering that the parolee be returned to the
appropriate correctional institution.' 51 The parolee's delinquency status
will be cancelled, if the Board member so recommends. The Board
member can withhold recommendation until further investigation is
made of the case if he feels that the violation report is an inadequate
basis for making a decision.
The recommendation of the Parole Board member is supposed to
take into consideraiton the well-being of the individual and the com-
munity, as well as the details of the violation. Although New York
148 Id.
149 In Harris v. State, 21 Misc. 2d 89, 91, 197 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (Ct. Cl. 1960), the
court stated that:
A prisoner is not entitled to credit for the time which elapsed between the date
of his delinquency as fixed by the Parole Board and the date when he is returned
to prison. During that time his absence from prison was unlawful and he was no
longer in the custody of the Board of Parole and thus the time could not con-
stitute actual or constructive service of his time of imprisonment.
Id. at 91, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 124, quoting People ex rel. Dote v. Martin, 294 N.Y. 330, 333, 62
N.E.2d 217, 218 (1945). See also Freeman v. New York State Correction Dep't, 20 App. Div.
2d 825, 247 N.Y.S.2d 415 (3d Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
150 See text accompanying note 121 supra.
1517 N.Y. CoDas, RuLEs & RaEs. § 1.17(b) (1971).
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courts have supported Board action in returning a parolee to prison
solely for violation of technical rules of parole, the Department of Cor-
rectional Services prides itself on the Board's willingness to consider
whether the technical violation truly presents a threat either to the
individual or to the community, and if no such threat exists, to recom-
mend that the parolee be restored to supervision in the community.
The Preliminary Hearing - Due Process
The landmark Supreme Court decision, Morrissey v. Brewer,152
handed down on June 29, 1972, inter alia introduced the constitutional
requirement of a preliminary hearing following the detention of pa-
rolees suspected of violations. This case clarified the application of due
process rights and protections to the entire revocation process, it marks
a sharp departure from the previous administrative and legal approach
to parole revocation.
The Pre-Morrissey Arguments Against Due Process in Parole Re-
vocation. Before Morrissey, the majority position in the United States
was that due process protections did not apply to parole revocation
procedures. 153 This approach is supported by several different theories.
First, it has been argued that protections warranted in a courtroom
are not necessary at the parole revocation hearing, which is non-adver-
sarial in nature. 54 This theory rests on the premise that all those pres-
152 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
153 Until very recently, most New York courts had denied most due process protections
at parole revocation hearings. See, e.g., People ex rel. Allen v. Follette, 33 App. Div. 2d
1051, 309 N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 1970); People ex rel. Brock v. La Vallee, 33 App. Div.
2d 722, 307 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Ochs v. La Vallee, 33 App. Div.
2d 80, 307 N.Y.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Smith v. Deegan, 32 App. Div. 2d
940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Johnson v. Follette, 58 Misc. 2d 474,
295 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1968). The fourth department of the appellate
division was the only one which had found a constitutional right to representation by
counsel, but this right was based on the state constitution not the federal. People ex rel.
Combs v. La Vallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dep't), app. dismissed, 22
N.Y.2d 857, 239 N.E.2d 743, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968). It should be noted that the denial of
counsel was statutory and these cases all passed on the constitutionality of that statute.
See also People cx rel. Frisbie v. McEvoy, 64 Misc. 2d 840, 844 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (Cortland
County Ct. 1970), which held that the right to counsel was available to a parolee in a
situation where a decision to revoke the prisoner's conditional release might result in
reincarceration for a term in excess of that to which the parolee had been sentenced. See
also Buchanan v. Clark, 446 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1971); Bearden v. South Carolina, 443
F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971); Barnes v. United States, 445 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971); Heezen v.
Daggett, 442 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1971); Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968);
Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Richardson v. Markley, 339 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.
1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Washington
v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961).
154 People ex rel. Smith v. Deegan, 32 App. Div. 2d 940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d Dep't
1960). In Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), the court expressed concern
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ent at the hearing are concerned with the rehabilitation of the parolee.
The Parole Board is seen as parent withdrawing a privilege for the
well-being of the parolee, rather than as an administrative body meting
out punishment.155 The validity of this approach appears to have been
already greatly weakened by the Supreme Court's ruling in In re
Gault,156 which held that a tribunal's parental attitude is no substitute
for the protections of procedural due process.
A second argument, the constructive custody theory, considers the
parolee to be in the legal custody of the Parole Board until the expira-
tion of the maximum sentence.157 Revocation of parole would thus
merely exchange one form of custody for another, and thereby negat-
ing any need for full due process protections. 58 This approach ignores
the very real differences between conditional freedom and incarceration.
The contract theory, a third approach, regards the parolee and the
Parole Board as parties to a contract under which the parolee promises
not to violate the rules of parole in consideration for his release. 159 This
theory is highly unrealistic in its assumption that the parolee actually
''negotiates" or "accepts" a contract since his refusal to accept those
conditions would result in continued incarceration.
The right-privilege distinction is a fourth justification that has
been used to deny the applicability of due process to parole revocation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Escoe v. Zerbst60 has been cited for
the proposition that where mere privileges which are a matter of grace
are involved, as opposed to rights, they may be taken away without due
process protections. The right-privilege distinction has lost much of its
force in recent years, as for example in the decision of the Supreme
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly,161 which disavowed the distinction and
that an adversary hearing with the full range of rights given defendants accorded in
criminal proceedings would destroy the parens patriae function of the parole board. Id.
at 949.
155 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
156 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
157 N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 212(6) (McKinney Supp. 1972). See Jones v. Cunningham, 871
U.S. 236, 241-42 (1963), where the Supreme Court found such custody as sufficient to
enable the parolee to maintain a habeas corpus proceeding.
158 United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1939); People
ex rel. Ochs v. LaValle, 3 App. Div. 2d 80, 307 N.Y.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't 1969).
'59 People v. Randazzo, 87 Misc. 2d 80, 82, 284 N.Y.S.2d 740, 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1962), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 248 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Ist Dep't), affd, 15 N.Y.2d 526, 202
N.E.2d 549, 254 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). See also United States
v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833), which held that a pardon was a contract which a prisoner
was free to accept with the conditions imposed on it or to reject it.
160 295 U.S. 490 (1985).
161 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425
F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 858 (1970). See also The Supreme Court,
1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 32, 67-68 (1970).
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substituted a balancing test measuring the impact of the loss on the
individual against the interest of the government in summary adjudi-
cation.
Part of the hesitancy of the courts to expand due process protection
to the parole revocation hearing has of course been based on the fear
of overburdening the administration of the correctional system,162 and
the courts which have the duty of reviewing such administrative deter-
minations. 163 Opponents of expanded due process protection point to
the right to counsel as a prime area where administrative concerns
of efficiency and expense are seen to outweigh the benefits derived by
the parolee. Judge Breitel, dissenting in People ex rel. Menechino v.
Warden 64 predicted that if right to counsel were granted, due process
would be extended to all aspects of the hearing which would take on
all the characteristics of an adversary proceeding before a judicial tri-
bunal. Judge Breitel further warned that expanded due process pro-
tection would result in practical problems of lack of sufficient funds,
personnel and facilities to properly administer an expanded concept
of parole revocation.'65 He and Judge Scileppi, in a separate dissenting
opinion, also argued that the legislature is better equipped than they
to order changes in the operation of the parole system. 16
The Morrissey Decision. The Supreme Court in Morrissey did not
accept any of the traditional theoretical arguments against the exten-
sion of due process protections to parole revocation procedures. The
court viewed parole revocation as a two-step process. The first step
consists of a factual determination of whether there has in fact been
162 See generally People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 394-95, 267
N.E.2d 238,249-50, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449,464-65 (1971) (Breitel, J., dissenting).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 394-95, 267 N.E.2d at 249, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 464. Judge Breitel predicted that
following the granting of such due process protection as the right to counsel, issue would
be raised as to:
Are the hearings to be recorded? Where will they be held? Who is to assign
counsel for indigent parolees? .... Will hearsay evidence be admissible? ....
Id. The accuracy of Judge Breitel's prophesy has yet to be seen, for cases extending
Menechino's application have left the limits of its due process protections intact. In People
ex rel. Silbert v. Cohen, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971), the court
held that juvenile delinquents who had been paroled from training school were entitled
to a hearing and assistance of counsel if there was action taken to revoke parole. The
court limited due process protections to "notice, a hearing and the aid of counsel," all
within the scope of protections imposed by Menechino. Thus while the Menechino doc-
trine was applied to a new situation, juvenile delinquent parole revocation, the due
process rights advanced were not in and of themselves expanded.
16527 N.Y.2d at 395-97, 267 N.E.2d at 250, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 465-66. He also noted that
this is especially true in New York State with its unique problems of population, urban-
ization, crime rate and already overburdened Parole Board. Id.
166 Id. at 392-95, 267 N.E.2d at 248, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 462-45 (Scileppi & Breitel, JJ.,
dissenting).
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a violation of parole. Only if a violation is found to exist does the sec-
ond step take place, a determination whether, based upon the viola-
tion, the parolee should be reincarcerated. Making this decision calls
for the use of some facts, but primarily involves the Board's ability to
judge the probable future success of parolees. 1 7
The basic question confronting the Supreme Court in Morrissey
was whether due process applies, in any form, to the parole revocation
process. The Court's initial bench mark was that "revocation of parole
is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revo-
cations."'168 The court did not stop at this point but proceeded to
recognize that "the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, in-
cludes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termina-
tion inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee ... ."169 The liberty of
parole, whether it is considered a right or a privilege, "is valuable and
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'170 The revocation of parole calls for "some orderly process,
however informal, which will embody that protection."''
Once the court had determined that some due process protections
were applicable it moved to the second question, how much process
was due. The Court emphasized the flexible nature of due process
protections, a flexibility determined by the particular situations. To
determine the extent of due process applicable to parole revocation the
Court compared the interests of the State with those of the parolee and
of society in general. The Court recognized the State's "overwhelming
interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment with-
out the burden of a new adversary criminal trial,"'72 and in having their
parole boards operate with sufficient discretion; but the Court de-
clared a simple factual hearing would not interfere with the Board's
exercise of discretion and in fact, the discretionary aspect of parole
revocation is not reached until after there has been a determination of
a violation. The Court could find no state interest in revoking parole
by summary treatment. 73 The Court also referred to society's interest
in the prevention of the termination of the parolee's liberty based on
erroneous information, and in the treatment of the parolee with basic
167 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972).
10s Id. at 480.
169 Id. at 482.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 483.
173 Id. at 483-84.
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fairness in order to enhance his chance for rehabilitation by avoiding
a feeling of arbitrariness on the part of the parolee.174
The Morrissey Court concluded that most states have recognized
that they have no interest in revoking parole without procedural
guarantees. 7 5 What is needed is an effective, but informal, hearing
structured to ensure that the findings of violation will be based on
proven facts and that the exercise of discretion will be an educated
one. Thus, due process first requires that a prompt preliminary hear-
ing be held promptly after the parolee's arrest. The preliminary hear-
ing would determine "whether there is probable cause or reasonable
ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that
would constitute a violation of parole conditions."' 7 This deter-
mination would be made by an independent hearing officer, that is,
one not having taken part in the initial decision to institute revocation
proceedings.1 77
The rights accorded the parolee at the preliminary hearing in-
clude notice stipulating: (1) that the hearing will take place, (2) what
the alleged violation is, and (3) that the purpose of the hearing is to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe the parolee has
committed the violation alleged. At the hearing the parolee may
appear and testify in his own behalf, present evidence or witnesses
favorable to him and request confrontation of those who have given
adverse information on which revocation might be based and ques-
tion them except where such confrontation would expose the in-
formants to harm. The hearing officer is required to make a summary
of all that happens at the hearing and based on that information de-
termines if there is probable cause to hold the parolee for the deci-
sion of the Parole Board on revocation. The hearing officer, in ren-
dering his decision, must state both the reasons and the evidence under-
lying the decision.178 The Morrissey case then went on to require a
revocation hearing by the Parole Board. 7 9
The initial judicial reaction to Morrissey has been to hold in
People ex rel. Van Burkett v. Montanye'80 that the Morrissey mandate
that the Parole Board must follow due process of law in revoking
174 Id. at 484.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 485.
177 Id. at 486.
178 Id. at 486-87.
179 See text accompanying notes 216-18 infra.
180 70 Misc. 2d 907, 335 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Wyoming County Ct. 1972).
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parole shall be selectively retroactive."' Although in the Morrissey
decision the Supreme Court said nothing about its retroactive appli-
cation, the New York Court of Appeals felt that its decision in People
ex rel. Maggio v. Casseles8 2 to apply on a selectively retroactive basis
the Menechino rule, which established the right to counsel in parole
revocation hearings in New York, provided precedent for the selective
retroactivity of Morrissey.8 3 The Supreme Court in Morrissey had not
dealt with the applicability of the right to counsel at any stage of the
revocation process, however, the New York State Supreme Court in
Richardson v. New York State Board of Parolels4 fully reviewed the
Morrissey and Menechino holdings and declared the right to counsel
applicable to the preliminary hearing as well as to the revocation
hearing. The court reasoned that the right to counsel was necessary
at the preliminary hearing because it was at this stage in the proceed-
ings that the essential charges of parole revocation are crystallized. 8 5
The Parole Revocation Hearing
The Parole Board has the authority to make all final determina-
tions regarding parole violations.188 After review of the parole viola-
tion report by a single Board member, the parole revocation hearing
is the final stage where binding decisions are made.
A hearing in a parole revocation case is mandated by statute. 8 7
Unlike the initial hearing, it is designed to examine and determine the
validity of specfic, disputed factual charges on the basis of evidence
presented. Thus, the hearing has been characterized as an accusatory
proceeding where the parolee's freedom or reimprisonment depends
upon the panel's factual findings regarding alleged misconduct. 88
Recent years have seen considerable ferment in the area of exten-
sion of due process protections to parole revocation hearings. Decisions
181 Id.
182 28 N.Y.2d 415, 271 N.E.2d 517, 322 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1971).
183 The court in Van Burkett did not set boundaries for selective retroactivity. How-
ever, it did state that the petitioner who had a hearing in January of 1972, which was
insufficient by due process standards, was entitled to the protection of Morrissey. 70 Misc.
2d at 909, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
184 71 Misc. 2d 36, 335 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
185 Id. at 41-42, 335 N.YS. 2d at 770.
186 N.Y. CoRRac. LAw § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Compare the current law with
N.Y. PRISON LAW § 218 (McKinney 1924), which provided for determination of parole
revocation by a jury trial rather than Parole Board action.
187 N.Y. ComEc. LAW § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
188 People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 381, 267 N.E2d 238, 241, 318
N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (1971).
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extending the scope of such protections have left unclear the exact
boundaries of due process in this context. There is no doubt, however,
that New York's parole revocation hearing must be substantially mod-
ified and expanded to comply with newly expounded constitutional
requirements.
General Description of the Hearing. The revocation hearing usu-
ally takes place at the correctional intsitution where the parolee has
been interred under the return warrant.1 s9 The revocation hearing
follows review by a single Board member 0 at the first available op-
portunity.191 Usually a minimum of four weeks elapses between the
initial review by a single Board member and the parole revocation
hearing.192 The enabling act also provides that the hearing be held
before a panel of three Board members, 193 but in practice the panel
may consist of two Board members other than the single member who
initially reviewed the violation report.194
The accused violator has a right to appear personally before the
panel, 195 and has the right to appear with counsel. 96 The parolee is
not given written notice of the charges pending against him, his only
information stems from communication with his parole officer.197 How-
ever, at the time of the hearing the parolee and his attorney have
access to the violation report written by the parole officer.'9 8 The pa-
rolee may confront his parole officer or witnesses marshalled against
him, as well as present witnesses on his own behalf. When measured by
189 N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972), stipulates that the hearing
shall be either at an institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction or
at such other place as may be designated. The New York State Parole Officers Field
Manual states that parolees placed in delinquent status will be returned to the nearest
prison authorized to receive violators. FIELD PAROLE § 217(4)(A). Compare New York's re-
quirement with the federal system where the parolee can request that the hearing take
place either locally or at the federal institution to which he will be returned.
190 7 N.Y. CoDEs, RULES AND REc. § 1.17(b) (1971).
191 N.Y. CoREc. LAW § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
192 Sokoloff, supra note 50.
193 N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
194 Sokoloff, supra note 50.
195 N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972). But see Cohen, Due Process,
Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 197-98
(1970), where the author points out that in 25 states the parolee does not have any oppor-
tunity to be heard at revocation hearings as these states either do not require a hearing
or require only ex parte proceedings for parole revocation.
196 People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1971).
197 In the federal system the warrant application states the charges and the evidence
in sufficient detail to give notice and permit preparation of effective defense. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
198 Sokoloff, supra note 50,
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the number and type of questions asked, the hearings are perfunctory
in nature.199
The Parole Board panel reviews the recommendation of the single
Board member and either affirms the recommendation or makes a
new decision as to the parolee's disposition. Only a majority of the
panel is needed to make a final decision to return a parolee to a correc-
tional institution,200 however, where a parolee is to be restored to super-
199 QUESTIONS IN NoN-Menechino VIOLATION HEARINGS
Number of Questions Number of Inmates
1-10 23
11-15 12
16-20 4
21-25 3
26-30 1
31-35 2
45
TYPE OF QUESTIONS ASKED AT NoN-Menechino VIOLATION HEARING
Drug/ Other Moti-
Total Number of Alcohol vational
Questions Asked Violation Problem Analysis Misc.
9 9
10 10
11 8 3
18 7 8 3
9 9
5 2 2 1
9 5 4
7 4 3
21 21
22 15 3 4
12 12
10 2 8
31 10 14' 7
15 7 6 2
11 11
28 13 15
9 2 5 2
11 11
21 7 14
8 6 2
10 6 4
20 4 5 7 4
7 2 2 3
16 6 10
14 14
34 28 6
11 7 3 1
10 10
8 4 1 3
200 The courts interpreted former section 219 of the Correctional Law to mean that
the Board had no choice but to send the parolee back to prison for the remainder of his
1973]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1
vision, or the delinquency cancelled, such action can be taken only
upon unanimous consent of the three members considering the case.20'
The parolee is notified of the Board's decision by written notice re-
ceived within a few weeks after the hearing. Notification of the Board's
decision usually does not explain the reasons behind it.
The fact that an individual's parole has once been revoked does
not automatically preclude parole at a later date for present or future
offenses.20 2 Credit is given to the reincarcerated parolee for the time
spent on parole, and previously earned good time credits are not lost
by revocation. However, a conditional release violator does not receive
credit for time spent under parole supervision, and he loses the ac-
cumulated good behavior time earned before he had been conditionally
released. 203 There is no periodic schedule for the rehearing of a rein-
carcerated parolee. The next hearing date is set on an individual basis
by the Board.
New York courts have restricted themselves to only a limited re-
view of a parole revocation hearing. The accepted judicial posture is
that the Parole Board has absolute discretion in its decisions as long as
they do not violate a positive statutory requirement. 201 Federal courts
similarly have consistently ruled that the reviewing court cannot sub-
stitute its judgment for that of Parole Boards or inquire into the suffi-
ciency or reliability of the information upon which the court based
its decision. 20 5
maximum term when he was convicted of a new offense. People ex rel. Treadway v.
Morhous, 276 App. Div. 812, 93 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1949), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 276 App. Div. 934, 94 N.Y.S.2d 187 (3d Dep't), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950);
People ex rel. Dayes v. Morhous, 267 App. Div. 851, 45 N.Y.S.2d 756 (3d Dep't 1944). How-
ever, under the new section 219, which has since been repealed, the case law, as seen in
Seible v. Oswald, 32 App. Div. 2d 696, 300 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't 1969), grants the Board
discretion as to whether the violator must serve out the balance of his first sentence.
201 Sokoloff, supra note 50.
202 N.Y. CoaREc. LAW § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
203 Id. § 212(5).
204 Hines v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 56 N.E.2d 572 (1944); Mum-
miami v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 5 App. Div. 2d 923, 171 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (3d Dep't
1958); People ex rel. Mahon v. Warden of N.Y.C, Dep't of Correction, 1 Misc. 2d 267, 274-
75, 144 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844-45 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955).
205Juelich v. United States Bd. of Parole, 437 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1971); Rose v.
Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Richardson v. Markley,
339 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 851 (1965); Rogoway v. Warden, 122
F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 808, rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 707
(1942). See also Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963),
which stated:
Judicial review of Board action with respect to a finding of parole violation is
admittedly narrow and limited. Even more limited is judicial review of the Board's
judgment as to what it should do about the violation. Once the violation is estab-
lished.., the exercise of discretion in determining whether or not parole should
be revoked, represents a very high form of expert .. . administrative judgment
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Due Process and the Parole Revocation
The Right to Counsel. Since the New York Court of Appeals de-
cision in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden,20 6 New York has been
among the minority of jurisdictions which give parolees a limited
right to have counsel and to introduce testimony at parole revocation
hearings.207 The court adopted this position contrary to both judicial
and the expert appraisal of the Parole Board in this area can be regarded as
almost unreviewable.
Id. at 240. But see Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971), in which the Federal Parole
Board revoked Arciniega's parole because of association with other ex-convicts. Arciniega
petitioned for habeas corpus claiming there was no evidence in support of this charge in
the record. The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld the Board's determination
on the basis that he worked at a bar with two other ex-convicts. 439 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.
1971). The Supreme Court reversed per curiam, holding that "[w]e do not believe that
the parole condition restricting association was intended to apply to incidental contacts
between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job .. " 404 U.S. at 4. The
Court further stated that such occupational association by itself was not sufficient evidence
of any other association in violation of parole restrictions. The Arciniega decision may
mark a new willingness on the part of the Court to review the adequacy of the evidence
at revocation hearings.
20027 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971). See 35 ALA. L. REv. 818
(1971). See also People ex rel. Maggio v. Cassacles, 28 N.Y2d 415, 271 N.E.2d 517, 322 N.Y.S.2d
668 (1971), in which the Court of Appeals ruled that Menechino should be selectively
retroactive. To require a new hearing for the thousands of prisoners affected would im-
pose a "purposeless and impossible burden on the parole board." To qualify for a rehear-
ing, the prisoner would have to show the Board failed to comply with due process in
revoking parole. If the record showed either a conviction for another crime or an "un-
explained substantial violation" of parole conditions, or fully established that a condi-
tion was violated or a parolee's explanation was false, no new revocation inquiry would
be granted. "[U]nexplained technical violations in inadequately developed contested cases"
would be sufficient to require reconsideration of the prisoner's parole revocation. Id. at
417-18, 271 N.E.2d at 519, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 671-72 (emphasis in original).
207 The minority rule establishing the right to counsel at parole revocation hearings
was first adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Tinson,
433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969). Previously, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957), held that the parolee
was entitled to counsel at a revocation hearing. This holding was based on a statute which
required a hearing and the court's view that a fair hearing necessarily included the right
to have counsel present. The Tinson court based its reasoning on the proposition put
forth in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), that counsel is "required at every stage of
a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."
Id. at 134. Since a parolee faces the possibility of being returned to prison, the parole
revocation hearing must be defined as a critical stage within the protection of Mempa.
The court rejected the argument that parole revocation was distinct from the situation
in Mempa, since sentencing had already taken place. The court took the position that
artificial labels attached to types of proceedings should not determine an individual's
constitutional rights. 433 P. at 332-33, 249 A.2d at 551-52. A majority of federal courts
have held that the right to counsel is not required in a parole revocation hearing. The
Tenth Circuit in Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1970), relying on
an earlier case, Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969), which had stated
the concept that probation is a matter of grace, has held that a state may choose to bar
counsel from a revocation hearing. The Ninth Circuit in Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585
(9th Cir. 1968), and Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967), has rejected claims
to various procedural protections including the right to counsel at a parole revocation
hearing on the reasoning that such compliance would make a parole system rigid and un-
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history208 and statutory enactments2 9 which had specifically denied
parolees this right.
The court reached its decision by giving full effect to Mempa v.
Rhay, which had held that counsel is "required at every stage of a
wieldly. The Sixth Circuit in Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 946 (1968), denied the right to counsel at parole revocation hearings on the basis that
the administration of the state's penal system is exclusively a state function under the
reserve powers in the Constitution. The Third Circuit has taken the position that denial
of counsel does not violate due process when the revocation is premised on either irrefut-
able evidence of a parole violation, United States ex rel. Halprin v. Parker, 418 F.2d 313,
315 (3d Cir. 1969), or on a criminal act conviction prior to parole revocation, United
States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 251 F. Supp. 773, 774 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd on opinion below,
367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 925 (1967). See also Buchanan v. Clark,
446 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1971); Barnes v. United States, 445 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971); Bear-
den v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971); Richardson v. Markley, 339 F.2d 967
(7th Cir. 1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
Many state courts have denied the right to counsel at parole revocation hearings. Johnson
v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 256, 453 P.2d 35, 39, cert. denied, 896 U.S. 904 (1969); Wingo v.
Lyons, 432 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d 809, 813-14
(Me. 1967); Baxter v. Commonwealth, 268 N.E.2d 670, 673-74 (Mass. 1971); Robinson v.
Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 59, 419 P.2d 253, 255 (1966); John v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37, 44 (N.D.
1968); Murray v. State, 444 P.2d 286, 237 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1059 (1969); Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 419, 454 P.2d 624, 625 (1969).
208 Prior to this decision, the lower New York courts had been virtually unanimous
in denying a parolee any due process guarantees at a hearing before the Board to consider
revocation of parole. See People ex rel. Allen v. Follette, 33 App. Div. 2d 1051, 309 N.Y.S.2d
128 (2d Dep't 1970); People ex rel. Ochs v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 80, 307 N.Y.S.2d 982
(3d Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Brock v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 722, 307 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d
Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Smith v. Deegan, 82 App. Div. 2d 940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d
Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Johnson v. Follette, 58 Misc. 2d 474, 477, 295 N.Y.S.2d 565, 571
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1968). But cf. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVaUee, 29 App. Div. 2d
128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 22 N.Y.2d 857, 239 N.E.2d 743, 293
N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968), which stated that a hearing to revoke parole involves the right of a
person to remain at liberty. Since the potential for deprivation of liberty at such a hear-
ing was just as significant as it was during the original criminal proceeding, due process
guarantees of the New York State Constitution were applicable.
Prior to the Menechino decision, a Cortland County court held that an individual
was entitled to counsel at a revocation hearing involving conditional release. The court
noted that due process required representation by counsel where a decision to revoke a
conditional release might well result in reincarceration for a term in excess of that
required by the sentencing court. Such a decision resembled the "deferred sentencing
procedures [of Mempal where substantial rights . . . may be affected" and therefore
counsel must be provided. People ex rel. Frisbie v. McEvoy, 64 Misc. 2d 840, 843-44, 317
N.Y.S.2d 684, 686-88 (Cortland County Ct. 1970).
209 N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 212(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (emphasis added):
Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a person who is on parole or
conditional release has violated the conditions thereof, the board of parole as
soon as practicable shall declare such person to be delinquent. Thereafter, the
board shall at the first available opportunity permit the alleged violator to appear
personally, but not through counsel or others, before a panel of three members
and explain the alleged violation.
After the Court of Appeals' holding in Menechino, a bill was introduced into the New
York State Assembly which would amend the Correction Law to include the right to
assistance of counsel at a parole revocation hearing. If the inmate were indigent, counsel
would be assigned to him and expenses paid out of funds appropriated by the office of
the state administrator of the Judicial Conference. The bill is currently under considerp-
tion by the Assembly's Committee on Rules,
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criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may
be affected." 210 The Court determined that parole revocation pro-
ceedings involving deprivation of a parolee's liberty and confinement
in prison, were of a nature requiring the presence of counsel to de-
velop and present matter of fact and law.21' Where individual liberty
is at stake, essential due process guarantees are applicable regardless of
whether the proceeding is classified as civil, criminal or administra-
tive.212 The majority in Menechino also argued that denying a parolee
the right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing would seriously
hamper rehabilitative efforts since that parolee is likely to believe
the decision to reimprison him was arbitrary.213
The Court of Appeals in Menechino gave serious consideration to
the possible difficulties inherent in granting assistance of counsel to
parolees at revocation hearings and accordingly defined the role of
counsel as a limited one, to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The
Court stated that counsel was not to act solely as an adversary of the
Board, use "trial tactics," or attempt to delay the presentation; rather
he was to assist the Board and the parolee by limiting his actions to
informing the Board accurately of the facts, and limiting the parolee's
testimony to only that necessary for the same end.2 14 The Parole Board
was deemed to retain full authority to decide the ultimate significance
210 589 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
211 Certainly a "parole court" or a parole board panel may not be permitted -
simply because it is an administrative body rather than a judicial tribunal - to
base its determination, having so serious an impact on the lives of the individuals
who appear before it, on a possibly mistaken view of the facts owing to the
parolee's inability to make a proper factual presentation.
People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 267 N.E.2d 238, 241, 318 N.Y.S.2d
449, 454 (1971).
212 Id. at 383, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 454. Compare Menechino with United
States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), where
the Second Circuit, reflecting the minority position in support of counsel at parole revoca-
tion hearings, emphasized the critical nature of the proceeding, the appropriateness and
necessity for a lawyer to deal with the narrow factual issues in such a proceeding, and the
lack of a showing that allowance of counsel at revocation proceedings would significantly
impede the state's correctional process. Id. at 1086-90.
The Bey case, however, emphasized that the right to counsel not only was limited but
did not attach until parole status was threatened with termination. Id. at 1088. See also
Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
213 27 N.Y.2d at 385-86, 267 N.E.2d at 243-44, 318 N.Y.S. at 456-57:
fjmhe parole system is an enlightened effort on the part of society to rehabilitate
criminals. Although few circumstances could better further that purpose than a
belief on the part of such offenders in a fair and objective parole procedure,
hardly anything could more seriously impede progress toward that important goal
than a belief on their part that the law's machinery is arbitrary, too busy or
impervious to the facts.
See also Note, International Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DUKE L.J.
139, 144-45.
214 27 N.Y.2d at 383, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
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of the facts brought before it. The Court held that this restricted role
of counsel would be sufficient to protect the parolee and assure a fair
hearing.215
Beyond the Right to Counsel - Morrissey v. Brewer. In addition
to introducing the requirement of a preliminary hearing into the parole
revocation process, the Morrissey decision substantially expanded due
process procedures at the final parole revocation hearings. Having held
that parole qualifies to some extent as a liberty protected by the four-
teenth amendment, the Court turned its attention to the issue of what
specific protections should be provided at the Parole Board revocation
hearing.
The revocation hearing, as the second step in the total revocation
process, is designed to determine whether there was a violation and
whether that violation warrants revocation. It should follow within a
reasonable time the arrest of the parolee. The parolee should be al-
lowed to show that he did not violate parole or that there were mitigat-
ing circumstances surrounding the violation. The minimum due proc-
ess requirements for proper conduct at this hearing include:
written notice of the claimed violations ... ; disclosure ... of any
evidence against [the parolee]; opportunity to be heard in person
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . . ; a 'neutral
and detached' hearing body ... ; and a written statement by the
fact finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking parole.2 16
The Court avoided the issue of right to counsel during the revoca-
tion process stating, "we do not reach or decide... whether the parolee
is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel
if he is indigent.' 217 However, the Court emphasized that it was not
writing a full code of procedure for the States, and had but outlined
minimum due process requirements.218
CONCLUSION
The parole revocation process in New York has been characterized
by a series of rules and reoulations which leave with the Board of
Parole and the Department of Correctional Services personnel a large
degree of discretion. The lack of procedural safeguards provided the
215 Id. at 384, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
216 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
217 Id.
218Id.
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parolee have, in the past, been justified by the non-adversarial and re-
habilitative nature of parole, the fact that the parolee is already a con-
victed felon and by administrative necessity. The recent disturbances
at the Attica Correctional Facility indicate that these reasons are no
longer accepted by inmates as sufficient to justify denial of due process.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Morrissey v. Brewer marks
a broad attempt by the Court to rectify many of the injustices which
can result from the absence of procedural safeguards at parole revoca-
tion hearings. Morrissey heralds a new era for New York in the admin-
istration of parole revocation. Preliminary hearings must be held and
notice of the revocation hearing provided the parolee, who must be
given the opportunity to present witnesses and to confront and cross
examine adverse witnesses. For the first time in New York, the fact-
finders are required to present a written statement as to the evidence
relied on and their reasons for revoking parole. It is important to note
that the Supreme Court in Morrissey was establishing only the mini-
mum qualifications necessary to comport with due process and as such
emphasized it was not replacing or obviating the need of the states to
formulate statutes embodying these and additional protections. The
need for the Legislature to act upon the problems in this area is es-
pecially important because of indications that due to lack of funds,
trained personnel and appropriate organization, the Department of
Correctional Services is ill-equipped to put into full practice the pro-
tections mandated by Morrissey. Significant change in the administra-
tion of our penal system can best follow from unified action of courts
and legislature.
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